Literature and Psychology

THE QUARTERLY NEWS LETTER OF THE CONFERENCE ON LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

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The work of art . . . has its correspondences with each region of the mind. It derives its energy, its irrationality and its mysterious power from the id, which is to be regarded as the source of what we have called 'inspiration.' It is given formal synthesis and unity by the ego; and finally it may be assimilated to those ideologies or spiritual aspirations which are the peculiar creation of the super-ego. The old metaphor underlying the word 'inspiration' is to this extent confirmed: that out of the darkness of that region of the mind we call the id, come these sudden promptings of words, sounds, or images from which the artist constructs his work of art . . . . We might elaborate the metaphor and picture the regions of the mind as three superimposed strata in which a phenomenon comparable to a 'fault' in geology has taken place. As a result, in one part of the mind the layers become discontinuous, and exposed to each other at unusual levels; the sensational awareness of the ego being brought into direct contact with the id, and from that 'seething cauldron' snatching some archetypal form, some instinctive association of words, images, or sounds, which constitute the basis of the work of art. Ideas, and all the rational superstructure of the mind, can be conveyed by the instruments of thought or science; but these deeper intuitions of the mind, which are neither rational nor economic, but which nevertheless exercise a changeless and eternal influence on successive generations of men — these are accessible only to the mystic and the artist, and only the artist can give them material representation, though naturally the mystic may be, and often is, one kind of artist — a poet.

— Herbert Read
"The Nature of Criticism"
in The Nature of Literature — British title, Collected Essays in Literary Criticism (New York: Grove Press (Evergreen Paperback No. E-92), 1958.)

IN THIS ISSUE

Announcements, Comment, and Correspondence. 33

"Ideas of 'Order' in Modern Literary Criticism," by Eleazer Lecky. 36

Professor Lecky, distinguished member of the English faculty of the University of Southern California, writes, "For some time I have been giving a course in semantics and one in literary criticism. In this paper I am concerned with some basic assumptions that literary critics today seldom analyze."

"Dynamics of the Tragic Catharsis," by Mary K. Wakeman. 39

It was inevitable that some scholar would some day attempt a synthesis of Aristotelian and psychoanalytic criticism. We are particularly happy to present this version of that synthesis, for the author identifies herself as a recent Cornell graduate with honors in English. She is now professionally engaged as laboratory technician in the Nuclear Studies department at Cornell, where, as she writes, "I keep up my literary interests through reading, writing and attending an occasional lecture. This will be my first paper in print. . . ."

"The Broken Dream of The Deserted Village," by Morris Golden. 41

The author, who reports that he is "generally, at least for the while, . . . most interested in the poetry and the poets of the mid-18th century," had his undergraduate training at The City College of New York and holds graduate degrees from New York University. At present a member of the English Department at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, he has published articles on his specialty in N&Q, MLN, and ELH, among others.

CONVENTION SECTION

Program for the Second Annual Meeting of Discussion Group General Topics 10 . . 35

"Authoritarian Patterns in Shakespeare's Coriolanus," by Gordon Ross Smith 45

First and foremost a Shakespeare scholar, Professor Smith brings to his specialty learning and skill in psychodynamic analysis as well. Holding bachelor's and master's degrees from Columbia, he completed his doctorate at Penn State, where he is now on the faculty. In addition to contributions to American Imago, Shakespeare Quarterly, and College English, among others, he has been a Folger Shakespeare Library Fellow and a bibliographer for the Shakespeare Newsletter and for the annuel MLA Bibliographies since 1958. He now has in preparation a comprehensive classified Shakespeare bibliography for 1936–1958, a much-needed supplement to the Ebisch and Schucking compilations.

"Psychiatrist and Saint in Eliot's The Cocktail Party," by Richard B. Hovey. 51

Research on his recently published biography of John Jay Chapman quickened and directed Dr. Hovey's interests in the application of Freudian psychology to literary criticism. An associate professor at Western Maryland College, Dr. Hovey has also published articles in the New England Quarterly, Modern Language Quarterly, A. A. U. P. Bulletin, and the Saturday Review. His "Our Illiterate Collegians" appeared in this October's issue of Best Articles and Stories.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION

Book Review 55

Professor Helen White Childers of Memphis State University in Tennessee has undertaken the full review of Norman Kiell's The Adolescent Through Fiction for which we asked in our last issue. Mrs. Childers recently received her doctorate from the George Peabody College for Teachers, where, under the direction of Professor Griffin, she wrote a dissertation entitled "American Novels About Adolescence, 1917-1953."

Listing of Other Books Received 56

With brief and not-so-brief comments on some of them.

Bibliography (XXXIV). 60

Offprints and contributions received, together with material from recent journals.

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ANNOUNCEMENTS, COMMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCE

** An interesting and news-packed letter from our old friend John Hagopian. [Your Editors are always interested in hearing about activities in our field, especially when they deal with inter-disciplinary courses and recent publications.]

July 15, 1959

Dear Leonard Manheim:

It has been a long time since we've communicated with each other, and I thought I would . . . write an informal sort of report on lit-psych activities at Michigan. Let me begin, immodestly, with myself. Two lectures: one on "Literature and Psychology" for the English Journal Club on campus, and — at last — a paper on "Psychology and the Coherent Form of Shakespeare's Othello" delivered at the spring meeting of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters in Lansing and to be published in the forthcoming Papers of the academy. Also an article, "The Mask of Browning's Countess Gismond" accepted by Philological Quarterly with publication date indefinite. Also, mirabile dictu, a curriculum revolution: the English Dept here has decided (at my instigation) to introduce a new course in psychology and literature taught by myself. I am on a Rackham Grant this summer to do research in that area and am preparing a course that will be based to some extent on experimental rather than clinical psychology, with heavy emphasis on perception and Gestalt psychology. Of course, traditional Freudian psychoanalysis

will get its proper due. I am also in charge of a new interdepartmental program in psychology and composition; ten sections of freshman English will be linked with introductory psychology. Reading for the course will be in the psych texts and many of the papers will be jointly graded by both the comp and the psych instructors. We had a trial run last year and have decided to expand the program. Perhaps all this has something to do with the fact that I am being promoted to assistant professor in the fall.

[Ed. note: Congratulations, and a word to our younger members, "Faint heart never won—promotion!"]

We are very fortunate to have as a new instructor in the department Leo McNamara (A. B. in English, M. A. in psychology, Harvard), who has worked for several years with Murray at Harvard and was assistant in the lit-psych program with Harry Levin there. He will be participating in the comp-psych program here, and is certainly a valuable man to have around. Herb Weisinger [Michigan State] spoke quite casually about the possibility of having a regional conference on lit-psych; I think it's an excellent idea and will prod him on the next chance I get. You may be sure that I will not miss the MLA meeting this winter, and I hope that we may at long last have our good talk together.

Very sincerely yours,

John V. Hagopian

We have sent Mr. McNamara a sample issue of LIT & PSYCH. It would be an excellent idea if our journal could be brought to the attention of every younger faculty member who might be interested.

** There's-much-remains-to-be-done Dept.:

It is reported that in the card catalogue of the Folger Shakespeare Library psychological interpretations of Shakespeare are listed under "Travesties and Burlesques."

An eminent publisher announces the publication of a work devoted to a denunciation of "the effect of Freudian teaching on all walks of life." The Freudian explanation, it is contended, "has become an apology for all that man does. It condones . . . incompetence and permissiveness." Plus ça change. . . . !

Program for the

SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF DISCUSSION GROUP GENERAL TOPICS 10

To be held at the Meeting of the Modern Language Association of America, on Tuesday, December 29, 1959; 11:30 a. m. to 12:45 p. m. in the Red Lacquer Room, Palmer House, Chicago, Ill.

I. Business Meeting (5 minutes)

1. Reports of the Chairman and of the Advisory and Nominating Committee.
2. Election of officers and committees for 1960.
3. Other business, if any.

II. Presentation of Papers

1. AUTHORITARIAN PATTERNS IN SHAKESPEARE'S CORIOLANUS

by Gordon Ross Smith, Assistant Professor of English at The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania. (15 minutes)

2. PSYCHIATRIST AND SAINT IN ELIOT'S THE COCKTAIL PARTY

by Richard B. Hovey, Associate Professor of English at Western Maryland College, Westminster, Maryland. (15 minutes)

III. Discussion

1. Prepared discussion, led by Norman N. Holland, Assistant Professor of English at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (15 minutes)

2. Discussion from the floor based (a) on the papers presented, (b) on contents of recent issues of Literature and Psychology, and (c) general topics in the field, in the order named. Each speaker will be limited to three minutes in all. Members who cannot attend are invited to submit brief statements in writing to be read or summarized by the Secretary.

OFFICERS FOR THE 1959 MEETING

Chairman & Editor: Leonard F. Manheim
Secretary: William J. Griffin
Associate Editor: Eleanor B. Manheim

Editorial and Program Committee: The Editors, Louis Fraiberg, Helmut E. Gerber, Simon O. Lesser.

Advisory and Nominating Committee: Wayne Burns, chairman (1959-61); Joan Corbett, Harry Bergholz, Leon Edel (1958-60).

NOMINEES FOR 1960

For chairman: William J. Griffin
For secretary: Helmut E. Gerber
To fill the vacancy on the Editorial and Program Committee: William Wasserstrom.
To the Advisory and Nominating Committee: Leonard F. Manheim (1960-62).

SPECIAL NOTE

In addition to the regular meeting of General Topics 10 as set forth above, there will be a committee meeting of those interested as contributors or advisers to the projected source book in psycho-literary criticism now being prepared. This meeting will be held on SUNDAY evening, Dec. 27, 1959, at 9:30 P. M. in Room 7 of the Palmer House. This notice constitutes an invitation to all those concerned or interested.

IDEAS OF 'ORDER' IN MODERN LITERARY CRITICISM

In the vocabulary of modern English and American literary criticism from Abercrombie to Zabel, the term "order" is so common that it has almost escaped notice. Critics use the term as an instrument of analysis but they seldom examine the instrument. No critic has written at length about it. Index-makers to books on critical theory generally omit it. There are few essays on the subject, the best of them being Austin Warren's brief preface to his Rage for Order (1948) and Lawrence Leighton's article, not on order but on "Disorder," in an early issue of the Kenyon Review (Spring 1939).

Warren took for his title a phrase from a poem by Wallace Stevens. Creative writers, he said, have both "a rage waiting to be ordered and a rage to find, or to make that ordering," and literary critics must participate "in the deep need and search of our time, for general principles of order." This second remark is much like an early one by T. S. Eliot, "the function of criticism seems to be essentially a problem of order" ("The Function of Criticism," 1923).

Yet Warren and Eliot, like critics in general, have focussed upon the "order" in creative rather than in critical writing, and therefore, from now on I shall be concerned with critics' notions of such order, notions which diverge. Critics do not agree, for example, on what a creative writer orders. According to Warren, again, it is "self" and "world." According to Eliot, in an essay about Joyce, it is "the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history" (" 'Ulysses,' Order, and Myth," 1923).

These statements differ essentially about the locus of order, which may be inside the psyche ("self" and "experience") or outside it ("world," "history," and "life") or both ("self," "world," and "life"). Another possibility is that the writer orders not persons or things but words. "The ordered cosmos, the brave new world of the imagination" which interested Joseph Warren Beach, may be regarded as a verbal construct ("The Witness of the Notebooks," 1948). To a formal critic like Elder Olson, a poem is a "distinctive synthesis" with "artistic order" because "it has a single form and is an ordered and complete whole" ("An Outline of a Theory of Poetry," 1949).

In addition to differences of opinion about what a writer orders, there are also differences about how he does it. For Robert Penn Warren "the artistic work shows us a parable of meaning — how idea is felt and how passion becomes idea through order" ("Ernest Hemingway," 1949). This explanation suggests T. S. Eliot's account of metaphysical poetry. But it also treats order as something different from both idea and passion, as possibly suprarational. It may be, however, that Warren had in mind what Cleanth Brooks called variously an "emotional and intellectual coherence." a unifying "attitude or complex of attitudes" (The Well Wrought Urn, 1947), and "imaginative unity" as opposed to mere "logical unity" (Modern Poetry and the Tradition, 1939). With a similar idea of logic, Murray Krieger insists that poetry's "ordering must not be accomplished in accordance with those principles that systematize other disciplines" but in accordance with some as yet unnamed principles (The New Apologists for Poetry, 1956).

Francis Fergusson, by contrast, denies the poet any "mystical or supernatural insight." "His realm," says Fergusson, "is where we all are, his material a reflection in his own spirit." It is the poet's experience, accumulated "at some deep level at the very edge of awareness," which, "perhaps because it has been accepted, comes to him as a harmony, a form or an order" (The Human Image in Dramatic Literature, 1957). This removes order to a subconscious level without analyzing it further. So does Ray B. West's definition of "insight or sensitivity" as "that perceptivity or natural awareness of the artist for the variety and range of sense objects surrounding him in nature and which he consciously or unconsciously organizes or synthesizes into an artful pattern or form. Thus . . . order . . . is the result of the artist's sensibility in operation" ("Ernest Hemingway: The Failure of Sensibility," 1945).

Perhaps it would be wise to abandon any attempt at greater precision than marks these quotations. When placed alongside John Crowe Ransom's flat statement,"Order is the logical arrangement of things" ("Poetry: A Note on Ontology," 1934), they remind us of complexities we cannot neglect but have not mastered. Yet there is more we can say about "order."

It is, to be sure, a primitive term, more easily modulated than defined. That is why it is so common in criticism, as in other theoretical discourse, and so little analyzed. In one of the few books on the subject, W. Donald Oliver has said that the concept of order is "central to almost all the problems with which philosophers concern themselves" (Theory of Order, 1951). Its ramifications were evident to Alfred Korzybski, who insisted that "the terms 'collection,' 'aggregate,' 'class,' 'order,' 'relations,' 'structure' are interconnected, each implying the others" (Science and Sanity, 1933).

Our English word is derived from the Latin ordo, for "line" or "row." It is easy to see that the components of a line or row bear a relationship to each other and to their total. The relationship may be called "ordinal" if it is one of position. This applies to contiguity or succession whether in space or in time. Thus we speak of "here" and "beside," of "now" and "later," and we use numbering words like "first," "third," etc. for either dimension. Still using ordinal language, we speak of the spatial or temporal relationship of "part" to "whole" or "cause" to "effect." But we may juxtapose two or more lines or other entities and view them as plurals or "cardinally," as having qualities besides continuity, qualities that may be compared and contrasted. In this fashion we match members of a class or classes according to properties such as details of structure, texture, function, etc. There is no apparent limit to the criteria that may be relevant individually or collectively to sorting this or that element of experience. By the basic test of

degree of similarity or difference, whether in origin, shape, color, age, or some other condition or set of conditions, X is taken to be more or less like Y.

Both types of order — contiguity and similarity — have to do with how things go together or seem to go together. That, of course, is why the problem of order is so central in philosophy. No summary discussion of the problem can be at all adequate. I shall simply point to some of the issues that are relevant to literary criticism and suggest very limited solutions.

I have so far called attention to types of order as if they were reasoned alternatives. This is not to deny that the human organism probably interacts with its environment at first unanalytically. Its early responses may be physiognomic ones, of the organism as a whole, to something in its environment. Yet as gestaltists have shown, perceptions are of configurations. Thus order by contiguity — part-whole relationships — is fundamental to experience. And the repetition of responses to a recurrent stimulus makes comparison possible.

It has been argued that order of any kind is but a function of the organism and that it cannot be logically attributed to the environment. It has also been argued that order is external and independent of the organism. In my opinion, the organism and the environment are separable, but when they are in relation to each other, as in the stimulus—response situation, they are not independent. Perception is a process whose characteristics are relative to the perceiver and the object perceived. It follows, then, that order which has to do with relations, is doubly or trebly relative.

In theorizing about order I have already been obliged to take this into account. For one thing, the noun form can most readily be explained in terms of the activity of naming, and more fundamentally, of thinking and manipulating. The verb "to order" commonly means "to put in order" or "to tell someone to do something in a certain order." To be aware of order is to be active. The very recognition, let alone the creation of order, is a sorting process, and somewhat relative to the sorter.

On the basis of physiology and neurology alone, it should be evident that the human nervous system responds to stimuli by channelling them into the finite channels of that system. Selecting and sorting are unavoidable. We simplify because we are simpler than our data.

Studies of the development of children indicate that the ability to sort evolves gradually. As infants we are considerably aware of order both by contiguity and similarity, but not until we are six or seven have we acquired a sense of calendar time. By then we know simple causation but not the subtler methods of induction or the complexities of deduction. That is to say, only with experience (including, in most cases, experience with language) can we abstract well enough to be "logical." Logical reasoning (including mathematics and symbolic logic), however, does not differ in kind from elementary ordering. Formal relations, no matter how abstract and pure and arbitrary, are still relations.

Man tries to discover how all sorts of things go together. The easiest task (difficult as that is) is to discover how they go together in the world seen as objective fact — the natural, quantifiable world of the physical and biological sciences, and the human, less quantifiable, world of the social sciences, where we study political, economic, or social "orders" and customs as well as patterns of psychological behavior. In each area preliminary ideas of order guide observation and, where possible, experiment, in a search for coordinates by which to order knowledge. In some areas, by ordered knowledge, we are able to predict events. In others, by operating in accordance with that knowledge, we can control them. Only then do we in part "order the world" rather than our ideas of it. In all cases we allow for a margin of error, anticipating that some events will be unforeseeable. Yet it would be rash to deny the possibility of order wherever we can not discern order. What we now know and can do about tides, waves, and tidal waves is no final account of their interrelations. Nor have we got to the bottom of heredity and environment.

Nevertheless, tides are said to be "orderly," tidal waves not. Of all the ways that entities go together, only some are considered "ordered" or "orderly," those which are regular, uniform, and, preferably, simple. In the glossary of his Operational Philosophy, Anatol Rapaport describes this usage. For "Order," he records: "structure of which one is aware especially structure which can be described comparatively easily." When something is simple we have less trouble keeping track of it and "understanding" it. Therefore, to understand we simplify, and we think we understand when, by ignoring important differences, we have over-simplified.

Perhaps this preference for simplicity goes with the need of the nervous system, mentioned earlier, to codify events according to its own structure. Rapaport is but one of many writers who presuppose a human "need for order" as basic as the need for food. Perhaps such an "instinctive" or pre-rational and egoistic need of the organism to enhance itself by organizing its environment is indistinguishable from the "desire for security" and the "fear of the unknown" that others, including Henry James, have guessed at. Nor would it be unwarranted to see anxiety and curiosity joined in that "rage for order" which appealed to Wallace Stevens and Austin Warren.

By referring to these predilections, I am making a bridge from the dimension of fact to the dimension of value. Entities not only exist for us, but have more or less interest for us, whether positive or negative. In addition to describing or classifying them relative to one another, we rate them according to our desires as relatively pleasant, important, good, beautiful, etc. We are guided in this by our innate preferences as affected by experience, including the influence of others within our group or, in some cases, outside it. Order for us is not only how things go together or seem to go together, but how we would have them do so.

To compare entities according to their worth to us, then, is to project "order" as well as to discover it. Yet in the choice between the "appropriate" and the "less ap-

propriate," discriminations of fact and idea according to the kinds of relation we have discussed are not irrelevant. To use such discriminations, however, is notoriously difficult because some of our predilections are so strong. The hierarchy of our interests, disciplined and undisciplined, affects the order of our values.

Because the dimension of value is not independent of the dimension of fact, serious creative writers deal with both. They need not be expert in any branch of science nor write literally, but their ideas of the world, especially of human nature, must be tenable. Moreover, like anybody's, their feelings are with respect to persons and things, sensations, ideas, and even other feelings, real or imaginary. That is why I. A. Richards, for example, could not persuade readers of poetry to disregard reference without also disregarding appropriateness.

The literary work of art, being rhetorically connotative as well as denotative, at one and the same time designates and evaluates. It is more presentational than discursive, conveying the feel of experience, what Henry James called "felt life," often without analysis. It tries to put intuitive or direct experience into words. Its order is a composite order of fact and value.

The literary work itself manifests another kind of order — aesthetic order. This is not independent of the others but a complication of them by the formal properties of language, which include temporal and spatial contiguity, similarity, and difference. All language is both sign (sound) and symbol (conventional sense). Literature uses sounds and rhythms and rhetorical patterns for the pleasure of unity in variety as well as for their appropriateness in structuring meaning. It may occasionally use lexical symbols, too, for their mere internal congruity, but at its best it includes their referential power.

The specific modes and methods of literary ordering have, of course, long interested critics. Modern critics, it is agreed, have contributed enormously to our understanding of the techniques of English literature. They have helped us to see not just content and form in isolation but the way form functions. My concern, however, is with the more general problem of the sort of order we expect from literature.

Our age, as Austin Warren said, is in search of general principles of order. For many reasons the world appears to resist understanding. As William James pointed out, the more we learn, the more ignorant we feel. On all sides information accumulates faster than anyone can assimilate it. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who believes that within a few years some one will discover a new scientific principle of "immense sweep and simplicity" for understanding the "maze of findings" about sub-atomic particles (Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1956), also laments the inability of specialists to master one another's specialties (New Republic, August 1, 1956). Social scientists are bewildered, too, by the rate of technological change and the accompanying social, economic, and political revolutions, whether local, national, or international. The very increase in the speed of transportation and communication and in the size of the audience for news magnifies the general feeling of instability. We have been unsettled, also, by what we have found out about our individual selves — the fluctuations in the stream of consciousness and in the vast undertow of unreason.

If our ideas of order are shaken, so are our value schemes. We feel that life lacks meaning or significance or order when our wants and expectations, whether egoistic or altruistic, have been frustrated. Individually, we feel powerless and sometimes on that account valueless. Moreover, we are likely to be divided by the pull of conflicting value systems and group loyalties. And we know, too, that technology has outrun wisdom and morality. We have a bad conscience about our inhumanity to one another. Poverty, crime, and war are facts. We blame ourselves as individuals for harm we may not ourselves have done but are, at least collectively, capable of doing.

It is not surprising, therefore, that out of a sense of ignorance, fear, disillusionment, and evil, a critic should see the world as orderless because it is not orderly. He finds "futility and anarchy" (T. S. Eliot) and credits reason, the imagination, or art with the creation of order, reason being "the recognition and creation of order where disorder was" (R. P. Blackmur, Anni Mirabiles 1921-1925, 1956), and literature a means of conquering "the meaningless actuality of life into ordered significance" (Lascelles Abercrombie, "The Function of Poetry in Drama," 1912). This view, it seems to me, both underestimates the degree of order in life and misrepresents the power of literature. Experience as such is not "without form or meaning" (Robert Wooster Stallman, "Life, Art, and 'The Secret Sharer'," 1948). Regardless of literature a great deal of ordering occurs. Literature, we may rightly maintain, helps us to order our experiences.

Under its spell, however, some critics have felt themselves to be in "a world more full of meaning than the real world" (H. W. Garrod, The Study of Poetry, 1936) or in "a world in which nothing irrelevant is known, but all is perfect order and secure coherence" (Lascelles Abercrombie, The Theory of Poetry, 1924). Another has said that "the pattern of a poem, by its unity of experience and recognition, in an ordered whole, can reveal the unity of all experience, idea, and order" (Robin Skelton, The Poetic Pattern, 1956). Such remarks tend to confuse simplicity with order — in literature or in literature and life. Though appearing to distinguish between words and things, they express undue veneration for language.

Writing in a similar vein, Edith Hamilton praised the poets of the nineteenth century because they "saw their art as bringing clarity into obscurity and order into confusion. They believed," she said, "that through it they had seen truth, which always banishes obscurity and confusion" ("Words, Words, Words," Sat. Rev., Nov. 19, 1955). This linking of order with clarity and truth — an absolute truth — disregards change. It presumes truth to have stood still at that moment in the idealized past when the darkness of dissociation descended. It does not matter that, as Jacques Barzun said, "at no time within the European past has there been a

calm, settled, or carefree intellectual order" ("Cry for Order," Sat. Rev., April 12, 1941), or that head and heart have customarily quarrelled.

We are obliged in one way or another to come to terms with our ignorance. I suggest that we acknowledge the relativity of order. Experience is complex, its interrelations are obscure, but it is not chaotic. Literature that best helps us to order our experience, both rational and emotional, is complex, too, and also not chaotic. It does not deny all order like Waiting for Godot, or exclude the intractable like Our Town. It contains light and shadow, though of no one pattern. In John Gassner's words, "A good deal of contradiction is needed to ensure an active, viable truth or 'order'" (The Theatre in Our Times, 1954).

For most critics the scope and the coherence of a work are important indexes of its value. Obviously, no ratio of one quality to the other may be standardized. In a work of great scope the interrelations may be abundantly but incompletely indicated. As a matter of fact, if they are so exactly specified that no ambiguity remains, the work will lack depth. Metaphor, which, as it is said, "creates order" by bringing together elements of experience not usually associated, also introduces irrelevancies and thus new complexities. And many symbols, like the white whale, elude definition. Correlate them with any single idea, and you have over-simplified.

Of course, communication of any kind simplifies. It leaves out and it arranges. Thus, as Allen Tate said, in fiction the deepest complexities are "ordered, fixed, and dramatized into arrested action" ("Techniques of Fiction," 1948). Paradoxically, a work may be orderly in its presentation of what the author regards as incomprehensible. He may, like Cable and Kafka, take great pains to omit evidence of rationalizable order. This is not "the fallacy of imitative form," as exemplified recently in Allen Ginsberg's "Howl," but a single and too singular vision of life or commentary on it.

Sometimes a work, like Ulysses or The Waste Land, presents complexities so complexly that at first it seems to us incoherent. Yet on further acquaintance we discover a pattern or possibly different patterns. The extended parallel between Ulysses and the Odyssey has become well known and so have the ironical contrasts between the present and the past in The Waste Land. Cleanth Brooks saw in that poem a "chaotic experience ordered into a new whole," by "the application of the principle of complexity" (Modern Poetry and the Tradition, 1939).

Some critics are attracted by complexity and others are repelled by it. But all critics, including Lawrence Leighton, who said of disorder that it can provide "a valuable extension of our personality," praise order of some kind. They may see life as chaos, but they expect literature to create or restore order, even to an entire culture. It would be better, I think, to expect from a literary master that he see life steadily but not whole.

Eleazer Lecky, Dept. of English
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DYNAMICS OF THE TRAGIC CATHARSIS

Perhaps more than any other art form, tragedy has been discussed with reference to its psychological effect upon an audience. What is the nature of the peculiar enjoyment afforded by the spectacle of terrible events? Aristotle's answers are still sound; perhaps a clearer understanding of them may be gained by an attempt to relate them to modern psychological theory.

The proper function of tragedy, Aristotle claims, is to arouse the emotions of pity and fear in the audience in such a way as to effect that special purging and relief of those emotions, which he terms "catharsis." /1 The attraction of tragedy is said to lie in the pleasure afforded by such relief.

According to Aristotle, a regulated indulgence of feeling serves to maintain the balance of health in our nature. This emotional cure is accomplished in tragedy by arousing emotions which are like in kind but not identical with those which disturb our equilibrium: an inordinate fear of death and consequent self-pity at the thought of one's own demise. For one who observes and is moved by a tragic performance, the pressures of material reality are removed and the emotions are disengaged from self-interest. Whereas the fear aroused by misfortunes occurring to one like ourselves prevents our pity for the hero from becoming sentimental, pity for another individual whose misfortunes seem out of proportion to his fault /2 divests that fear of selfishness. The spectator, becoming one with humanity through the hero, quits the narrow sphere of the individual and experiences an impersonalization of emotion through participation empathetically in a course of action which, if it is structurally sound, becomes an image of human destiny. /3 Thus the tragic purgation is a direct result of the action, plot, or dramatic movement of the play. A readjustment of mental energies is brought about by the recognition of realities which are often obscured; in that way a constructive working balance is re-achieved.

The concept of catharsis in Freudian psychology originated in Breuer's hypnotic treatment of hysteria. This, briefly, consisted in the removal, through hypnosis, of the resistance which had forced repressed energy into the syndrome, so that the patient might convert this psychic energy into physical manifestation in the process of abreaction. The patient, in a hypnotic trance, was led back to the causal situation and allowed to vent feelings previously repressed. The symp-

1/ Lane Cooper. Aristotle on The Art of Poetry (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 17.

2/ Ibid., p. 39.

3/ S. H. Butcher. Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (New York: Dover Publications, [cop. 1951]), p. 263.

toms then disappeared, temporarily or permanently.

This explanation is by no means inclusive enough to account for the purging effect of tragedy. Excitation of the tragic emotions and participation in the imaginative expression of them does not in itself constitute a cleansing or purification of these passions. Equally if not more important is the quality of order and control inherent in a plot which is an organically unified whole, such that every part is necessary and in its place. /4 It is the conscious apprehension of the logical inevitability of cause and effect which is finally responsible for the readjustment which constitutes the emotional cure, the "settling, sudden and perceptible, into one's . . .natural state." /5

Recognizing the uncertainty of Breuer's hypnotic method, Freud soon rejected it in favor of the method of free association. The object of this method is to bring the unconscious material to consciousness so that it may coincide with the conscious knowledge of the cause of the repression secured during the analysis. /6 This accomplished, the patient, having abandoned his resistances, is in a position to deal constructively with the conflicting impulses, an opportunity hitherto lost to him because he had not admitted some of the crucial forces. The ideal condition of mental health is not a perfect, static balance, but a dynamic conflict which differs from that of illness in that it is controlled by consciousness.

Can we not conceive of tragedy as a form of mass psychoanalysis? The pressures of everyday life are removed as we subject ourselves to an imaginative experience. "The maintenance of the aesthetic illusion promises the safety to which we are aspiring and guarantees freedom from guilt, since it is not our own fantasy we follow. It stimulates the rise of feelings which we might otherwise be hesitant to permit ourselves, since they lead to our own personal conflicts. It allows in addition for intensities of reaction which, without this protection, many individuals are unwilling to admit to themselves. . . . The vicarious participation in the hero's destiny is the mechanism by which this effect comes about." /7 Once aroused, our feelings are controlled and reduced to healthy proportions through the artistic order imposed upon the action of the play. With the dénouement comes the realization of the consequences of the action in which we have been so ready to participate; our empathy for the hero, or "transference," /8 is loosened and we become spectators once more, curiously relieved of the pressures of dammed-up instinctual demands which have found vent in the vicarious experience. Thus refreshed, we are better able to meet the conflicting demands made upon us in our daily lives. While this may be a more helpful analogy, it is still incomplete as an explanation of the specific nature of tragic pleasure.

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud considers in passing the paradox that artistic imitations aimed at an audience "do not spare the spectators (in tragedy, for instance) the most painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as highly enjoyable." /9 His single comment is that such cases "which have a yield of pleasure as their final outcome, should be undertaken by some system of aesthetics with an economic approach to its subject matter." /10 This suggestion in conjunction with his discussion of the pleasure principle may provide a helpful lead.

To review Freud's thesis briefly: "[T]he course of mental events is . . . set in motion by an unpleasurable tension . . . and it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension" /11 which is felt as pleasure. Unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation present in the mind, pleasure to a diminution. Thus the pleasure principle may be described as "a tendency operating in the service of a function whose business it is to free the mental apparatus entirely from excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in it constant or to keep it as low as possible." /12 The factor determining the feeling of pleasure is the amount of increase or decrease in a given period of time. But in the natural course of experience the tendency toward the pleasure principle is opposed by other forces and circumstances: the reality principle, "temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure"; /13 unpleasure caused by conflicts which take place while the ego is developing a more complex organization; unpleasure arising from the perception of pressure by unsatisfied instincts, or threatening external circumstances.

But most important of the conditions which override the pleasure principle Freud calls traumatic excitation; that shock (from outside or within) strong enough to break through the protective, shielding mechanism of the pleasure principle and to disturb the energy balance to such a degree that all efforts must be employed in mastering and "binding" the amounts of stimulus so that they can subsequently be discharged. This "binding" is the conversion of a free-flowing cathexis, or accumulation of psychic energy pressing toward discharge, into a quiescent cathexis the discharge of which can be postponed and controlled. Only after the binding has been accomplished can the pleasure principle proceed unhindered.

4/ Cooper, op. cit., p. 31.

5/ Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1.11, as translated by Lane Cooper in his An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922), p. 62.

6/ Sigmund Freud. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Translated by James Strachey. (New York: Liveright Pub. Corp., 1950), p. 18.

7/ Ernst Kris. Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (New York: Internat. Univs. Press, 1952), pp. 45-46.

8/ Roy Morrell, "The Psychology of Tragic Pleasure," Essays in Criticism, VI, 1 (Jan. 1956), 34.

9/ Freud, op. cit., p. 17.

10/ Ibid.

11/ Ibid., p. 1.

12/ Ibid., p. 86.

13/ Ibid., p. 6.

What is it that ordinarily obstructs the achievement of the sense of well-being, of peace within oneself gained by that releasing of tensions which Aristotle calls catharsis? One might call it by that general and overworked term, anxiety, or describe it more specifically as f e a r of insufficient control over one's own impulses and over external circumstances. Characteristically, tragic action involves the unleashing of man's most dangerous impulses, and portrays man in the most dire circumstances. The one enormous difference between this experience as real and as an aesthetic presentation is that in the latter the burden of self-control requiring the suppression of unacceptable impulses, and of self-preservation necessitating resistance to realizations so painful as to endanger psychic balance, is freely abandoned, is given over into the hands of the artist whose creation it is. We as spectators have the advantage of participating in the ordeal and final self-knowledge of the hero, while at the same time allying ourselves with the artist in his absolute control of the action as expressed (ideally) in the beautiful language and the perfectly proportioned form of his finished work.

The result is a great saving of energy as well as a sense of increased strength. It is as if we were to stand aside for a moment, stripped of all desire and inhibition, and view the vicissitudes of human life without affection, and see all that to which our ordinary involvement makes us blind. We see cause and effect and are gratified that all is just: we have for a moment that freedom, that mastery, that can only come with complete honesty, made possible by the special circumstances of the tragic drama. We have been wheedled, flattered, tempted, and encouraged in every way to be open to this new expansion of soul: the hero with whom we identify ourselves is a fine fellow whom we admire even as we see his weaknesses. The story objectifies our own problems in a symbolic way which gives them form while maintaining the security of ambiguity. Our base impulses are allowed expression in the safety of a shared experience. The beautiful language ensures that our sensibilities will not be offended. The tragic cast itself assures us that man and his problems will be treated with the highest seriousness. All things conduce to the saving of that energy ordinarily employed in guarding against excessive stimulus; it is no longer necessary and can be reserved for a future exigency. "When, as in relieving anxiety, fiction simultaneously produces an energy saving and gives us a sense of increased strength, the disproportion between the energy suddenly put at our disposal and the demands upon us may be regarded as the source of our apparently 'illogical' positive feeling of exhilaration and pleasure." /14

This, I think, is in substance the conclusion at which Freud would have arrived had he followed his suggestion to its end. Tragedy is a traumatic experience delivered bound. A free-flowing cathexis has been transformed into usefully available energy. We are exhilarated, not by a simple release of tension, but by a feeling of power, of vitality to spare, and of the kind of satisfaction that comes only with personal achievement.

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14/ Simon O. Lesser. Fiction and the Unconscious (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 268

THE BROKEN DREAM OF THE DESERTED VILLAGE

From its own time to ours, Goldsmith's major poem has occasionally been attacked for its lack of unity, as well as for its sentimentality. Crabbe, by implication, called it an artistic lie; Macaulay complained that it was false historically and sociologically; and one modern view sees it as a rather mawkish sample of descriptive verse. All of these attitudes criticize The Deserted Village as discursive prose only. But it seems to me authentic poetry, unified and made meaningful through a connected symbolic pattern that not only reflects the author's peculiar orientation to life at this stage of his career but also catches a psychological state occasionally shared by most of his readers.

While Goldsmith was writing The Deserted Village, his past was rapidly disintegrating. As Austin Dobson has pointed out, work on the poem began at about the time of his brother Henry's death, in the spring of 1768; /1 and it is clear from the dedication that Henry was much on his mind while G o l d s m i t h was writing it. Goldsmith's few letters to Ireland of this period complain that all that he hears from his family is news of decay. When another brother, Maurice, wrote that he was coming to London in search of a career, Goldsmith replied (January 10, 1770):

> I should have answered your letter sooner, but in truth I am not very fond of thinking of the necessities of those I love when it is so very little in my power to help them. I am sorry to find you are still every way unprovided for, and what adds to my uneasiness is that I received a letter from My Sister Johnson by which I learn that she is pretty much in the same circumstances. As to myself I believe I might get both you and my poor brother in law something like that which you desire, but I am determined never to ask for little things or exhaust any little interest I may have until I can serve you him and myself more effectually. /2

The Lawders have been kind "to our poor shattered family" (Letters, p. 85); "I believe I have written an hundred letters to different friends in your country and never received an

1/ Austin Dobson, Life of Oliver Goldsmith (London, Walter Scott, 1888), p. 140.

2/ Oliver Goldsmith, Collected Letters, ed. Katharine C. Balderston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), pp. 83-84.

answer from any of them" (Letters, pp. 86-7); "Tell me about my mother. My Brother Hodson and his son, my brother Harry's son and daughter, My Sister Johnson, The family of Bally Oughter what is become of them where they live and how they do. You talked of being my only Brother. I dont understand you. Where is Charles?" (Letters, p. 87). Maurice when he came was so disappointing that Goldsmith, despite his readiness to help others, summarily sent him home to learn a trade. Goldsmith did not hear from Charles until April or May (the poem was published late in May, 1770), and news of his mother could not have been encouraging, for she was to die in September, 1770. It is this depressing family background which, after the impulse initiated by Henry's death, provides the emotional attitude whose expression permeates The Deserted Village.

The Deserted Village contains an idealized picture of Goldsmith's childhood, as has been obvious since Crabbe's time. Auburn's "bowers of innocence," he says, were "Seats of my youth" (ll. 5-6); /3 the villagers are shown playing, not working (16-30); the two full-length portraits are clearly father figures; the tavern is primarily an idealized symbol of warmth, companionship, at least temporary security for the narrator, who is, as Goldsmith generally sees himself, a perpetual traveler; and the vision is never disturbed by the narrator's involvement in the action — he always sees the village activities as separate from himself. These are, then, idyllic memories of Goldsmith's childhood — thus far a fairly conventional view. But the conventional view, while aware that the description of Auburn as it was is more than a simple prose picture of Goldsmith's early environment, assumes that the remainder of the poem is to be read literally. Thus have arisen the questions of where Goldsmith found a depopulated village in England, how important luxury was as an agent of depopulation, whether Auburn was Lissoy, and the rest. But there seems to me no valid reason for reading the poem in two different ways, its present need not be construed more prosaically than its past.

To begin with, Auburn's pristine state is contrasted with other things besides Auburn's enclosed ruins. It is contrasted with the vaguely painful world in which the narrator wanders; with London, the seat of luxurious depravity; and with frightening America. That is to say, as an extinct childhood paradise, a static and innocent world, it is compared not only with itself later on, but, essentially, with every environment in which adults must act.

Next, it is worth noting two of the village's most conspicuous characteristics. Such was Auburn's innocence that even its minister, who (either in his official function or in his symbolic one as a father) would normally be depicted as attacking or warding off evil, achieves his preeminent position in the dream through not recognizing evil. When it appears, in his guests, he almost deliberately refuses to see it:

> His house was known to all the vagrant train,
> He chid their wand'rings, but reliev'd their pain. . . .
> Pleas'd with his guests, the good man learn'd to glow,
> And quite forgot their vices in their woe;
> Careless their merits, or their faults to scan,
> His pity gave ere charity began.
> (ll. 149-50, 159-62.)

His positive actions, like those more logically assigned to the schoolmaster, involve children; his serious thoughts are with heaven, which one assumes is a permanent and even more idyllic Auburn; he has no work or force as an adult. And Goldsmith's father and brother, both ministers, existed now only as childhood or youthful memories.

The other basic quality of this Eden is its sexlessness. The dances and games of the young peasants that open the poem must be pure, since the elders look on approvingly; the serving maid in the tavern is "a coy maid" who is "half willing to be press'd," but that is presumably as much as she will allow (l. 249). The last picture of Auburn proper is of

> The breezy covert of the warbling grove,
> That only shelter'd thefts of harmless love. (ll. 361-62.)

And the ruined girl of lines 325–36 was once modest in her cottage, "Sweet as the primrose peeps beneath the thorn." This combination of sexlessness and the absence of evil as the primary qualities of the memory of childhood is familiar to readers now from many sources, perhaps most effectively from The Sound and the Fury.

Furthermore, and very naturally, Goldsmith sees the village and its associated symbols as sanctuaries to which to flee from the mind-cracking demands of the adult world. Of his abandoned hope of retirement in Auburn, he emphasizes that it would have been an escape: happy is the man

> Who quits a world where strong temptations try
> And, since 'tis hard to combat, learns to fly! (ll. 101-2)

The retired person is happy largely because the world's evil is no longer forced on him; he is removed from the necessary commission of evil which is every active man's lot:

> For him no wretches, born to work and weep,
> Explore the mine, or tempt the dangerous deep;
> No surly porter stands in guilty state
> To spurn imploring famine from the gate. . .
> (ll. 103-6.)

The tavern is a place where workers "retire" (l. 222), a word significant in view of its earlier context, and its chief virtue is that it gives the peasant "sweet oblivion of his daily care" (l. 242). The country minister, as I have noted, is spared the necessity of judging people (ll. 16-62).

Retirement, of course, makes the ostensible connection, the discursive, prose connection, between the narrator and the village; he had hoped to retire to Auburn, he says, but there

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3/ All citations from The Deserted Village are from Oliver Goldsmith, The Poetical Works, ed. Austin Dobson (London, Oxford University Press, 1927).

is no Auburn now and he must continue to wander. If we read literally, as the poem has so long been read, we may well ask why Goldsmith should not retire elsewhere. We then conclude that Goldsmith has sentimentally mistaken the true situation in England and, joining Macaulay, we condemn him for his ignorance. If we read literally, we agree that the sorrows of the villagers are great, and we sympathize with Goldsmith's sympathy for them. But, we ask, is this enough to justify his extreme and personal emotionalism? However, there is no more reason to read prosaically here than in the description of the pure Auburn. As the developing symbols in the poem show, it is not his lost retirement but his — not the villagers' — ejection from innocence that he is bewailing.

Goldsmith's chief theme, as in his other writings, is the contrast between himself as homeless wanderer and the family security of his past. In The Deserted Village he makes the discovery that his past is irrecoverable — that there is no home for the traveler. In structure, it is clear that he is standing aside, alone surveying the wreckage; and here the identification of his own loss with that of the village is so effectively (and perhaps unconsciously) made. Of himself in relation to the village he says:

> Sweet Auburn! parent of the blissful hour,
> Thy glades forlorn confess the tyrant's power.
> Here as I take my solitary rounds,
> Amidst thy tangling walks, and ruin'd grounds,
> And, many a year elapsed, return to view
> Where once the cottage stood, the hawthorn grew,
> Remembrance wakes with all her busy train,
> Swells at my breast, and turns the past to pain. (ll. 75-82.)

As we are aware now, but as the eighteenth century was not, recurrences of a symbolic action reflect the interrelation, almost the identity, of its various manifestations in the author's mind and project this interrelation to the reader. /4 Goldsmith's picture of himself as a single, lonely thing wandering in a wilderness forces on us at least his partial identification with other objects shown in the same circumstances. The old watercress gatherer, for example, clearly resembles Goldsmith's current image of himself: all life is gone,

> All but yon widow'd, solitary thing
> That feebly bends beside the plashy spring;
> She, wretched matron, forc'd, in age, for bread,
> To strip the brook with mantling cresses spread,
> To pick her wintry faggot from the thorn,
> To seek her nightly shed and weep till morn;
> She only left of all the harmless train,
> The sad historian of the pensive plain.
> (ll. 129-36.)

Symbolically, she is doing all along what Goldsmith is: supporting herself by gleaning alone in the wilderness. She is even metaphorically, as he is in fact, "The sad historian of the pensive plain."

In Goldsmith's picture of the farm-girl ruined in London, he uses a literary cliché with curious effectiveness:

> Ah, turn thine eyes
> Where the poor houseless shiv'ring female lies,
> She once, perhaps, in village plenty bless'd,
> Has wept at tales of innocence distress'd;
> Her modest looks the cottage might adorn,
> Sweet as the primrose peeps beneath the thorn;
> Now lost to all; her friends, her virtue fled,
> Near her betrayer's door she lays her head,
> And, pinch'd with cold, and shrinking from the shower,
> With heavy heart deplores that luckless hour,
> When idly first, ambitious of the town,
> She left her wheel and robes of country brown. (ll. 325-36.)

Undoubtedly, much of the power of this picture derives from its graceful, restrained statement; but much, also, is due to its being the symbol that unifies Goldsmith's objective sadness over the passing of Auburn and his subjective, unaware appraisal of himself. /5

Female loss of innocence becomes the major symbol tying together Goldsmith's ostensible theme, the decay of English village life, and the actual one which gives the poem its emotional appeal. England, he says, is like

> some fair female unadorn'd and plain,
> Secure to please while youth confirms her reign, [that]
> Slights every borrow'd charm that dress supplies,
> Nor shares with art the triumph of her eyes:
> But when those charms are pass'd, for charms are frail,
> When time advances, and when lovers fail,
> She then shines forth, solicitous to bless,
> In all the glaring impotence of dress.
> (ll. 287-94.)

The older England (now corrupt) and the older farm village (now decayed) have been shown as pure women; the recurrence of the image toward the end necessarily shares in the emotional context they have produced and helps to justify to the reader the self-pity in which Goldsmith there indulges. Tearfully, the poet says farewell to another pure and, in this case triumphantly incorruptible female, Poetry:

> And thou, sweet Poetry, thou loveliest maid,
> Still first to fly where sensual joys invade;
> Unfit in these degenerate times of shame,
> To catch the heart, or strike for honest fame;

4/ If I read Kenneth Burke correctly, this is a valid extension of his discussion of image clusters in The Philosophy of Literary Form (Louisiana State University Press, 1941), especially pp. 258-92.

5/ Another lonely figure, the bittern (ll. 43-44), had been a bird of ill omen in Goldsmith's childhood home, Lissoy (see Poetical Works, p. 180). Without pressing the identification of poet and bird, it may be noted that its appearance is quite consistent with the terrified expectation of chaos by which Goldsmith is dominated.

> Dear charming nymph, neglected and decried,
> My shame in crowds, my solitary pride...
> Thou nurse of every virtue, fare thee well!
> (ll. 407-13, 416.)

It is significant, I think, that the poem ends with no suggestion that the narrator wishes to follow the pure maid to her new home; indeed, it might be somewhat surprising that one described as a restless wanderer should be content to allow his only bliss to leave for an area to which he is physically capable of following. But if the implication of the uses of this symbol, as well as of the lonely character amid the ruins and of the perfect child's world, are considered, the surprise vanishes. For Goldsmith's purposes in this poem, all virtue has fled with his childhood dream; but he is, inevitably, no longer a child. His innocence is gone and, like the innocence of the betrayed farm girl and of painted old England, irrecoverable. He cannot, therefore, go with Poetry, who is properly, and forever, untainted.

Seen from this viewpoint — that the poem is a symbolic picture of the disintegration of the author's dream world of childhood innocence — the exaggerations and inconsistencies, of which Goldsmith's dedication indicates his uneasy awareness, are explainable. Commerce, industrialization, which Goldsmith generally and consciously admired, here are so violently castigated because they are fairy-tale ogres which make a nightmare of a dream of childhood; the rich, selfish merchant is a grotesque monster because his very existence implies a more complicated set of values than a child can cope with. And the much discussed problem of Goldsmith's view of luxury becomes more soluble. He is here describing the process of civilization in much the same terms as in his other writings, but in language oppositely charged. That is, Goldsmith everywhere analyzes the history of societies as a development from rude agricultural barbarism to graceful though perhaps effeminate sophistication; his considered opinion, in the abstract, is that the process is a good and, what is more to the point, an inevitable one. But here, again, it is the very inevitability that is most distressing. It seems to me that he is so violent against luxury precisely because it is a function of time — as a society evolves, it must become luxurious: the child and his world must be destroyed in order that the adult world, with all its demands, may exist. The unadorned female must grow older and discover paint. The village girl must in time experience sex. Oliver Goldsmith must become an adult, and face evil.

In view of the symbolic structure of The Deserted Village and the actual nature of its poetic impulse, it seems not only worthwhile but necessary to reconsider the poem in our time. It is, undoubtedly, an essay on England's threatened decay because of luxury, enclosures, depopulation, and the emigration of the best English stock; it is also a fine sympathetic picture of the sorrows of the sufferers from enclosure, of the English farming village as an idyllic place, and of Goldsmith's happy childhood years. But I believe its essence is something far more meaningful in our modern conception of poetry — the author's anguished discovery, spurred by events in his own family, that every child must grow up, that the adult world necessarily carries with it an admixture of evil, that none can be pure except the dead.

This theme is worked out symbolically (very probably unconsciously) and not, as the others are, through prose discussion. The childhood world is shown directly as harmless, gregarious, asexual, trusting, innocently unaware of evil. The adult world, stripped of its adventitious (though sometimes eloquent) political and sociological cover, is pretty much what Eliot, Hemingway, and Faulkner have accustomed us to: disintegration, loneliness, sex, the necessary contamination with evil, the obligation to judge and the attendant oppression by guilt.

This is, I think, the true poetic charge of The Deserted Village, the electricity that is transmitted from poet to reader. Unfortunately, the form — the conductor, to continue the metaphor — is purely of its time. Goldsmith did not know how to dispense with it, nor did he consciously wish to; decorum, didacticism, and the injunction against the tulip's stripes were still important criteria for him, though they inevitably weakened the sort of poetry toward which he seems to have been impelled. But here the genuine poetic impulse was not stifled.

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> To some who take one side in these controversies much of what I have to say will seem platitudinous; to some who take the opposite side these same platitudes may seem to be the grossest heresies. I have addressed myself . . . especially to students and teachers who are still sufficiently unsophisticated to be neither bored by the platitudes nor shocked by the heresies.
>
> —J. H. Woodger
> [Quoted without further identification
> in Contemporary Psychology, IV, 2, 41.]

AUTHORITARIAN PATTERNS IN SHAKESPEARE'S CORIOLANUS

The purpose of this paper is to try to indicate how closely some of the characters in Shakespeare's Coriolanus parallel in their surface appearance certain character syndromes first formulated by Erich Fromm in Escape from Freedom and subsequently empirically verified by the studies of Adorno and his associates. /1 I am aware that the philosophical ideas and the unconscious assumptions of mankind may greatly vary from any one time and place to any other, and also that the intellectual revolution of the later seventeenth century has made the habitual content of the commonplace Elizabethan mind seem sometimes as strange to us as that of an ancient Greek or Egyptian. But although assumptions and philosophy sometimes vary so much, I doubt that the character syndromes or innate mental mechanisms which are the framework holding the aforementioned assumptions and philosophy differ much more from age to age than does the human physical form. It is with innate mechanisms and generic responses that I am here concerned. If the range of human character structures and mental mechanisms is finite, however large, then obviously a writer in any age who used direct observation might record a given syndrome quite unaware that a later age might rediscover that syndrome and give it a pejorative name. Such observations would in many ways be comparable to those of Galen or Robert Burton, both of whom recorded signs of physical and mental ailments whose causes they had no modern knowledge of, but which are readily recognizable today.

The chief literary advantage of making such an analysis as this is that we may reduce the great number of incompatible interpretations of this play offered with equal conviction over the last century and a half by ruling many of them out of further consideration on the grounds that they are unsupported by empirical evidence. We will then come much closer to knowing whether the play should be acted, for example, as noble tragedy or as tragic satire.

Before beginning these comparisons, I should like to warn that "authoritarian" and "authoritative" are not interchangeable terms. The latter is an approval word; the former, a pejorative one. It seems to me that a rational man must give a certain amount of deference to, say, a nuclear physicist on matters which are a physicist's specialty. Indeed, a rational man owes some kind of deference to anyone who can speak authoritatively, providing we define "authoritative" as able to demonstrate a knowledge greatly superior to that of the common man in that something in which a person is authoritative. A well-informed man who is aware of how many times in history an established, authoritative position has proved to be wrong may entertain some slight reserve with his deference, but if he is aware of his own dearth of knowledge on some subject, he will hardly put it into the balance with the knowledge of someone who is authoritative as I have tried to define that term. An authoritarian opinion or person is altogether different, and therein lies the common confusion. For an authoritarian position may resemble an authoritative one in that it implies superiority and demands acceptance, but differs in having so little that is demonstrable to justify it. Essentially, the words are as different as "sanguine" and "sanguinary." When we recognize that an authoritarian position will commonly be paraded as an authoritative one, we can see that for some people the confusion may become — just dreadful. The cure, I think, lies in one's insistence upon the demonstration of what facts support the position in question.

In analyzing this play for authoritarianism, we shall repeatedly ask in specific ways two general questions. The first is, What harmony or lack of it exists between the characters' declarations about themselves and their actions? Or to put the question in the terms of twentieth century so-called realist Shakespeare criticism, Is character description a cue to the meaning of the action? The second question is, What correspondence is there between the characters of the persons of the drama — where character is determined both by what the person says and by what he does — and modern empirical formulations of authoritarian and non-authoritarian character syndromes? Instead of summarizing the hundreds of pages of Fromm, Adorno, and subsequent writers, I shall merely mention as I go elements of the authoritarian character as Fromm, Adorno, et al., have determined it, and the appearance of those elements in certain characters. No one parallel constitutes proof of my thesis, but together I believe the accumulation of parallels is compelling.

One of the commonest characteristics of authoritarians is to ally or identify themselves with a person, institution, class, god, or other entity which is, or which the authoritarian thinks to be, of great strength. I submit that the chief authoritarians in Coriolanus are Menenius, Virgilia, Volumnia, and Coriolanus himself. Menenius' idolized power is the patricians and especially Coriolanus, whom he had "godded" (V.iii.11) /2; Virgilia's is Coriolanus alone; Volumnia's power-idol is primarily the Roman state, which she equates with patricians only, and secondarily her son, who is her support in maintaining her position with those patricians. For Coriolanus the idolization is only secondarily of the Roman patricians; primarily it is of his mother, whose values he has consequently taken over totally. It is for these reasons that Volumnia sacrifices her son for the Roman state, as she had said she would do in her first scene, and that he sacrifices himself for his mother, as the first citizen implies he could do before he has yet appeared. What apparent inconsistencies Volumnia and Coriolanus show are merely logical ones; psychologically they are quite consistent: their logical inconsistencies can always be found explicable in terms of their authoritarian alignments and sado-masochistic ten-

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1/ Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941). T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).

2/ Line numbers are from Shakespeare, Complete Plays and Poems, ed. Neilson and Hill (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1942).

dencies, even to the last extremes of destructiveness in Coriolanus, who from plans to burn Rome and to massacre the inhabitants turns at the behest of his mother to conscious self-destruction. But this extreme development of Coriolanus' character is preceded by many other patterns that are also present in modern formulations of the authoritarian personality.

Fromm divides the authoritarian's sadistic strivings into three types: The first is "to have absolute and unrestricted power over" others. From the first scene until his banishment Coriolanus repeatedly declares the people should have no participation in government, and that what power they have should be taken from them:

> What should the people do with these
> bald tribunes?
> On whom depending, their obedience fails
> To the greater bench? . . .
> Let what is meet be said it must be meet
> And throw their power i' th' dust.
> (III.i.165-171.)

The second type is to use or to exploit others. Coriolanus calls the plebs a "musty superfluity" which Rome can "vent" in war (I. i.229-230). He shares his attitude toward them with his mother, of whom he says:

> I muse my mother
> Does not approve me further, who was wont
> To call them woollen vassals, things
> created
> To buy and sell with groats, to show bare
> heads
> In congregations, to yawn, be still and
> wonder
> When one but of my ordinance stood up
> To speak of peace or war. (III.ii.8-13.)

He admires Aufidius for his valor, flees to him after his banishment in spite of having been told very explicitly that Aufidius hates him, masochistically offers Aufidius his life, and yet once he is allied with him, he dominates over Aufidius, too. Whether domineering or subservient, Coriolanus seems unaware of the unceasing quality of Aufidius' hatred and of its mortal danger to him. Such behavior may be illogical or irrational, but it is not inexplicable, and really all aspects of his relationship to Aufidius are understandable in terms of the modern formulation of the authoritarian personality.

The third type of sadistic striving is to make others suffer or to see them suffer. Such is Coriolanus' attitude toward the starving and toward his banishers, and in his plans to burn Rome not even those sympathizers who had offered to accompany him in his banishment are to be spared.

Not all of these sadistic impulses are overt. Fromm lists five rationalizations of sadistic impulses, most of which Coriolanus at one or another time displays. The first rationalization is, "I rule over you because I know what is best for you, and in your own interest you should follow me without opposition." If for "I" we substitute the patricians, "our best elders" with whom Coriolanus identifies himself so often, the first half of this rationalization is his most persistent demand, as it is that of Menenius also. Coriolanus, of course, does not profess to have any plebeian interests at heart, and the second half is best seen in such lines as these of Menenius:

> I tell you, friends, most charitable care
> Have the patricians of you. . . .you slander
> The helms o' the state, who care for you
> like fathers. (I.i.66-79.)

I consider these lines rationalization because the play does not contain any examples of benevolent paternalism on the part of patricians, and the chief patrician of the play openly and consistently displays his contempt.

The second rationalization Fromm cites is, "I'm so wonderful and unique I have a right to expect others to depend on me." Coriolanus declares he should become consul without the public vote, which he thinks the plebeians should be deprived of, however ancient the custom. He constantly asserts his own superiority in virtue and power and the right of his own class, whom he calls eagles, to rule the rest of the populace, whom he calls crows, geese, etc. The third rationalization is, "I have done so much for you I am entitled to take from you what I want." What he calls "Mine own desert" (II.iii.71) and patrician right to what he wants are two of his three insistent themes when he stands for consul and when he harangues the town with his proposal that the plebeians should be deprived of all their established rights. The fourth rationalization, "I have been hurt by others and my wish to hurt them is nothing but retaliation," he makes explicitly when he joins Aufidius, and again when he receives the first Roman embassies. Even if we acknowledge that he has suffered an injustice, it is impossible logically to reconcile his leading the Volscian armies against Rome, which includes the patricians, with his earlier declaration that he owes the Senate and presumably the patricians his life and services. The fifth rationalization, "By striking first I am defending myself or my friends against the danger of being hurt," is his third insistent theme in his denunciations of the tribunes and the people.

Sadism in authoritarians has other characteristic forms of expression which Coriolanus and members of his group also display. Powerlessness arouses the authoritarian's contempt, and Fromm declares, "the very sight of a powerless person makes him want to attack, dominate, humiliate him." Shakespeare has twice juxtaposed Coriolanus' prolonged and supererogatory abuse of the plebeians to his immediately respectful demeanor toward the patricians (I.i.168-255; III.i.1-170). Although he contemptuously abuses plebeians for alleged fickleness, the imagery he employs in the following passage demonstrates that it is plebeian weakness as much as fickleness that has provoked his contempt. He declares, "He that depends / Upon your favours swims with fins of lead / And hews down oaks with rushes." The course of the play proves the plebeians less changeable in loyalties than he.

The Adorno studies declare that typical authoritarians are generally devoid of introspection and insight and tend to project their own inacceptable qualities upon their opponents: "Not oneself but others are seen as hostile and threatening." (Adorno, p. 474) Although Coriolanus repeatedly accuses the

plebeians of rebellion and predatory behavior, and although some of their behavior does lend color to his charges, yet he himself is the most violent, rebellious, and predatory person in the play. The citizenry in comparison are very tractable, and the only people who appear to feed on others are the patricians upon the plebeians. We can quote the Adorno studies in describing Coriolanus: "Moral condemnation serves the purpose of externalization of, and defense against, temptations toward immoral and unconventional behavior" (Adorno, p. 420). These tendencies Shakespeare makes quite explicit in Coriolanus' later actions.

Aggression in authoritarian persons tends to be moralistic, punitive, explosive, physical, and destructive, whereas in liberal persons it tends to be principled, intellectualized, verbal, and relatively mild and regular in its release. In Coriolanus' harangues, his attack on the unarmed citizenry, and his later march on Rome, we see in action the destructive violence that he had three times threatened in the first act. In comparison the actions the tribunes take against him are, as in liberal persons, governed by persistently held principles (of popular self-interest), and both language and behavior are less violent than those of Coriolanus.

His own internal sense of weakness obliges the authoritarian to be allied with and dependent upon an external source of strength, but, says Fromm, "if the authority in which he believes shows signs of weakness, his love and respect change into contempt and hatred" (Fromm, p. 172). Thus we can see through Coriolanus' repeated protestations that what he does he does for his country, and through his respect for the patricians. No sooner has he been banished than the patricians, who had not saved him, become "our dastard nobles," deserving of his hatred and revenge, against whom he will fight "with the spleen / Of all the under fiends" (IV.v.96-98). There is no remorse, no insight into his own faults, no love of country: only the authoritarian sense of victimization, contempt, and hatred. Clearly his early threat to fight the Roman soldiers who were not supporting him as he demanded was dramatic preparation for this greater reversal. His march on Rome, the breakthrough of his anti-social drives, might have been predicted, so to speak, by the writer of the following passage:

> Display of a rough masculine facade seems to be a compensation for... passivity and dependency. Rigid repression of hostility against parents may be accompanied by an occasional breaking through of drives in a crude and unsocialized form; under certain circumstances this may become dangerous to the very society to which there seems to be conformity. (Adorno, p. 482.)

But submission and domination in Coriolanus are for himself, not for the nobler principles he parades, and this also the first citizen had declared in the opening scene.

So far we have seen from the test of the play how closely domination in Coriolanus parallels the nature and forms of sadism in modern authoritarians. The evidences of masochism in Coriolanus are just as complete. Behavior that a psychiatrist would dub masochistic is commonly thought of by the authoritarian himself as love and loyalty, and so Coriolanus is depicted as feeling it. Initially he gives his loyalty to country and patricians, and subsequently to Aufidius, and in opposing the innovation of tribunes, he gives it to custom also. However, when custom requires that he submit to the weak and lowly by standing publicly in the gown of humility, then he rejects custom as he subsequently does Rome, patricians, and Aufidius. The only person he cannot reject or be rejected by, as said above, is his mother. Both her rejections of him reduce him to tearful obedience.

Other common patterns of authoritarian masochism are a belief in the necessity of catastrophe, love of the conditions limiting human freedom, love for the idea of being controlled by fate, and fear of starvation or of being "devoured" by the strong, all of which appear repeatedly in the lines of the Coriolanus group, but seldom in those of the non-authoritarian characters. Thus Coriolanus is sure of further rebellion from the plebeians, whereas after his banishment Rome knows the only internal peace it has in the whole play. His love of conditions limiting human freedom is seen in his rejection of Greek precedent in grain distribution and in his demands for the total disfranchisement of the plebeians.

The deliberate conformity characteristic of authoritarian masochism is also explicit. Most important is his adherence to Volumnia and to her values, but also present is evidence of a consciousness of playing a part. He says to his mother at the beginning of the first capitulation scene:

> Why do you wish me milder? Would you have me
> False to my nature? Rather say I play
> The man I am. (III.ii.14-16.)

But actually to say that one is playing a role indicates not spontaneity but conscious conformity to that role and doubt as to the effectiveness of the performance, which doubt suggests a considerable gap between the underlying impulses and the role played. A spontaneous man does not play roles: he behaves as he sees fit and proper, and if he has doubts about his actions, they will be on the score of perception, logic, rightness, but not on whether he properly played a role. It is clear from the above passage that Coriolanus is conforming to a role designed by his mother. Volumnia's answer makes explicit this element of falseness in his character: "You might have been enough the man you are,/ With striving less to be so." As if to clinch the matter, in the second capitulation scene Shakespeare has Coriolanus refer to himself as a "dull actor," and I think we are obliged to conclude that Shakespeare thought this tendency a minor but persistent one in the character of Coriolanus, like the tendency of the Nurse in Romeo and Juliet to call for aqua vitae in any emergency.

The Adorno studies declare the authoritarian's attitude toward his parents "one of stereotypical admiration, with little ability to express criticism or resentment." Parents are thought of as being "wonderful"; emphasis is on "background" and aristocratic superior-

ity. Coriolanus declares his mother "has a charter to extol her blood"; although he says he hates a "promise-breaker," he never directly reproaches her — Hamlet-like —for her recommendations of deliberate deceit, but instead only laments that in using deceit he must by implication kow-tow to the commonalty. He refers to her as "the most noble mother in the world" and as "Olympus" to whom he himself is "a molehill." Such conscious admiration, however, seems inconsistent with his march on Rome and his threats to spare not even his own family. However, identification with the family and the in-group, wrote Adorno, is "one of the main mechanisms by which such people can impose authoritarian discipline upon themselves and avoid 'breaking away' — a temptation nourished continuously by their underlying ambivalence.

The preceding central patterns of authoritarian character are accompanied in Coriolanus by a large number of concomitant patterns that are more or less clearly expressions of the sado-masochistic strivings. Simultaneous tendencies to self-glorification and self-contempt express both kinds of strivings, and Coriolanus shows both. The former appear frequently in harangues upon tribunes and plebeians, as when he speaks against "mingling them with us, the honour'd number, / Who lack not virtue, no, nor power"; the latter appear on the battlefield and again in the forum when he depreciates himself and refuses to hear himself praised. In his refusal of praise we may also suspect in him an unwillingness to be submitted even by implication to the judgment of his supposed inferiors. In a later passage Shakespeare has explicitly juxtaposed both of these tendencies:

> City
> 'Tis I that made thy widows: many an heir
> Of these fair edifices 'fore my wars
> Have I heard groan and drop. Then know
> me not,
> Lest that thy wives with spits and boys
> with stones
> In puny battle slay me. (IV.iv.1-6)

The logic is very bad, for why such unaided and successful valor should now fear boys and women is inexplicable. It may be argued that these lines are ironic, and that there is dramatic irony I can grant, for at the hands of these people of whom he is so contemptuous Coriolanus will lose his life. That the lines are irony on Coriolanus' part I cannot see: he is no more given to irony than he is to introspection. Rather, I think they must be considered part of that final revelation of the extremes of character that we so often get toward the end of a Shakespearean play, such revelations as Brutus' unjustifiable quarrel with Cassius or Shylock's sharpening his knife on the sole of his shoe. Both chronologically and in the logic of dramatic development the address to Antium comes between the bad logic of "I banish you" (III.iii.123), and his last and most incredible declaration, "Pardon me, lords, 'tis the first time that ever / I was forc'd to scold" (V.vi.105-6). The address to Antium (IV.iv.1-6) is about as concise a dramatic statement as one could have of the authoritarian's irremediable insecurity which no self-glorification can really allay.

Other concomitant patterns are the following: pseudo-masculinity and emphasis on energy, struggle, competitiveness and achievement, as when Coriolanus brags, "like an eagle in a dove-cote I / Fluttered your Volscians in Corioli; / Alone I did it"; concern with the body, seen in Coriolanus in his consciousness of his own bloody appearance, and of his wounds, in his wanting to wash, and in his detestation of the woolless toga. Concern with the body is seen in Volumnia and Menenius in the absurd catalogue of scars, and in their frequent rejoicings in Coriolanus' physical strength. Intolerance of ambiguity is beautifully explicit; Coriolanus exclaims:

> . . .my soul aches
> To know, when two authorities are up,
> Neither supreme, how soon confusion
> May enter 'twixt the gap of both and
> take
> The one by th' other. (III.i.108-112.)

Sense of victimization and denial of fault are obvious in his complainings about the "dastard nobles" of Rome. The Adorno studies also cite a certain "gullibility" in authoritarians, which may be seen in Coriolanus in the ease with which tribunes and Aufidius play upon his character to their own ends. He never sees through them well enough to counter their moves by behaving otherwise than they all expect; unlike Hamlet, he answers the surface of their comments and never perceives the underlying purposes. His lack of insight is also evident in his attitude toward promises: he professes to be constant and to hate promise-breakers, but he breaks his own major promises, and so we are probably supposed to understand the wager in I.iv. as the first hint that he does not keep his word if doing so would be to his disadvantage.

What the Adorno studies call the "impoverished potentialities for inter-personal relationships" characterize Coriolanus in dealing with common soldiers, plebeians, Menenius, and Aufidius. We may also detect impoverishment in his marriage. Whether he be returning from battle, bidding the women goodby, receiving the embassy — upon which occasion he turns from Virgilia to Volumnia with the words, "You gods! I prate" — or finally capitulating, his primary attention is to his mother, not to his wife. In both capitulations it is his mother whom he would please and mollify, not his wife who has little or nothing to do with the contests taking place.

The typical role for a woman in an authoritarian community according to Adorno "is one of passivity and subservience. She is an object of solicitude on the part of the man." Virgilia, with her house-bound timidity and her "faint puling" is obviously this to the point of caricature. Since authoritarians idealize family members, she becomes his "gracious silence," and simultaneously an opportunity for him to brace his own uncertain superiority. The subservience of authoritarian women frequently conceals underlying hostility toward men, which may be manifested by "the living out of her thwarted ambitions through the medium of the man" (Adorno, p. 478). In Volumnia we see caricatured this other extreme of feminine authoritarianism: her envy of men is evident first in her unequivocal usurpation of as much of the masculine role as she can manage and later in her living through Coriolanus to enjoy what she cannot seize for herself.

One of the most remarkable and rewarding things about this play is the precision and economy with which, time and again, Shakespeare has woven typical patterns of authoritarianism into single passages, and those passages into whole scenes. A few examples must suffice at present. Menenius says to the citizens:

> I tell you, friends, most charitable care
> Have the patricians for you. For your wants,
> Your suffering in this dearth, you may as well
> Strike at the heaven with your staves as lift them
> Against the Roman state, whose course will on
> The way it takes, cracking ten thousand curbs
> Of more strong link asunder than can ever
> Appear in your impediment. For the dearth,
> The gods, not the patricians, make it, and
> Your knees to them, not arms, must help. Alack,
> You are transported by calamity
> Thither where more attends you, and you slander
> The helms o' th' state, who care for you like fathers
> When you curse them as enemies.
> (I.i.66-80.)

Here, explicitly or implicitly, we have the invincible power of authority, superhuman forces, necessity of catastrophe, limitation of freedom, the strength and virtues of the superior classes, the alleged perfidy of the weaker and lower classes, the necessity of submission, and factual untruth. Those who disagree he accuses of folly and wickedness; that the plebeians might have any right on their side he does not conceive. Coriolanus presently asks the same citizens,

> What's the matter
> That in these several places of the city
> You cry against the noble Senate, who
> Under the gods, keep you in awe, which else
> Would feed on one another?

Here we have again the supposed superiority of rulers, the inferiority of the ruled, supernatural oppression, limitation of freedom, fear of catastrophe, and the implication of folly or malice. When Coriolanus and Aufidius meet in battle, Coriolanus cries, "Let the first budger die the other's slave, / And the gods doom him after!" Again, sadism in the utter mastery of the winner, masochism in the slavery of the loser, and "fate" in the gods' posthumous decree. Coriolanus declares that the granting of tribunes is an act "to make bold power look pale" (I.i.216), but that bold power should be frightened is a self-contradictory declaration; it suggests that the "bold power" is a front for a permanent state of fright. Of Sicinius Coriolanus declares, "If he have power, / Then vail your ignorance; if none, awake / Your dangerous lenity." (III.i.99) Out of context this passage might be conceived as a plea for the statesmanship of the patricians as against the demagoguery of the tribunes and the incompetence of the populace. But if we examine it in context, what do we find? It is both preceded and followed by lines that are concerned only with plebeian power as opposed to patrician. The logic of the passage I have cited then becomes a revelation of character, for it says, "If he have power, give in, but if he has none, he's dangerous." Many more such passages can be cited.

Fromm has remarked that the authoritarian may show courage, activity, and belief, and we can grant Coriolanus the possession of all three of these qualities, although the first two are strictly physical in their manifestations and in no way intellectual or ethical. We can also grant him a reasonable pride in the directness with which he expresses his offensive and often irrational opinions, and we can grant that his "lonely dragon" departure from Rome after banishment is written to be played sympathetically. But the possession of certain virtues does not outweigh his faults and make him a sympathetic hero.

The major antagonists of Coriolanus — Aufidius, the tribunes, and the Roman citizenry — are sharply contrasted with the Coriolanus group, first, by being free of authoritarian compulsions, and second, by their displaying attitudes and behavior which the Adorno studies often label "liberal."

Aufidius and both tribunes pursue their ultimate objectives with a single-mindedness the opposite of the hectic gyrations of loyalty and declared objective in Coriolanus. They approach their problems open-mindedly, for Brutus says to Sicinius, "Let's . . ./ . . . carry with us ears and eyes for th' time, / But hearts for the event" (II.i.284-286), and Aufidius declares to his associates, ". . . bring me word thither / How the world goes, that to the pace of it / I may spur on my journey" (II.x.31-33), and later when asked what should be done, he answers, "Sir, I cannot tell, / We must proceed as we do find the people" (V.vi.15-16). Aufidius and the tribunes consider the feelings and potentialities of the people realistically, and successfully manipulate them; they recognize the complexities of human situations; they discuss and speculate about what their opponents may do, and finally they achieve their objectives. But Coriolanus and his group can only argue or denounce ("a simple, firm, often stereotypical" and moralistic cognitive structure, as the Adorno studies say), and their attempts at control are inept. In the general wrangle preceding the riot, Sicinius tells the citizens that Coriolanus would take away their liberties. Menenius protests his declaration as "the way to kindle," to which a senator adds, "To unbuild the city and to lay all flat" (III.i.198-199). Authoritarians, who customarily think of their property as extensions of themselves, would naturally be prone to think of a city as buildings. Sicinius answers, "What is the city but the people?" and the citizens agree with him, thereby illustrating the liberal's concern with persons rather than with things. Finally, both tribunes are possessed of moral courage and speak out against what they consider wrong, as liberals often will, even though not allied with the prevailing structure of power. Brutus speaks his mind at the ceremonies honoring Coriolanus, and rejects the rebuke of Menenius; Sicinius speaks up for the people's legal rights against the special privileges requested by Coriolanus during the

same ceremonies. So also in the marketplace challenge and in the banishment scene. Both initially and later the tribunes pursue their duties in spite of the threat or show of violence which is offered by Coriolanus and which they could not hope to counter physically.

A close scrutiny of the behavior of the plebeians shows that like the tribunes they are chiefly non-authoritarian. When in the first scene the patricians are preparing to file out in hierarchical order, Coriolanus twice orders the plebeians to "follow," but Shakespeare's stage direction reads, "citizens steal away." Similarly, they refuse to charge for him at Corioli, and his threats prove useless. The voices they give him for consul are frequently reluctant: "The price is to ask it kindly." "But this is something odd." "An't were to give again, — " (II.iii. 81-90). Only once do they follow him, and there it is under the combined impulses from Cominius and victory. Both in charging for Lartius and later on the plain before Corioli they prove neither cowardly nor foolhardy but sensibly courageous, as the tribunes are in civic life, and how could it be otherwise when they formed the body of the Roman army? Contrary to the declarations of Coriolanus and Menenius that they riot, feed on one another, and cannot be ruled, the citizens show themselves mild and amenable; it is Coriolanus who commits all the faults he accuses them of having. Though resentful, they are quiet when insults are hurled upon them, whereas Coriolanus is explosive. Even under his provocation they show themselves to be generally fair-minded and gentle, none of which qualities he ever shows toward them. It is true they show inconstancy by reportedly haling Brutus up and down, but although they and Coriolanus share this fault, they are neither so changeable nor so violent as he. Certainly this Roman populace is different from that of Julius Caesar. Inevitably the people are many-minded. The authoritarian mentality of Coriolanus objects to democratic diversity of opinion, for such diversity strikes him as disunity and hence as weakness, and the ambiguities of diversity in opinion are insufferable to one who needs clear and simple formulations. Hence there is no chance of their pleasing him, for the only way they could all be of one mind would be through the automatisms of authoritarian conformity, and authoritarian is what they are not.

One of the first questions a person might ask about the interpretation I have offered here is whether Shakespeare might not have been fully in sympathy with Coriolanus because he was authoritarian himself. The answer, if we can rely upon the Adorno studies, is quite easy, for these empirical studies indicate that authoritarians see themselves in an entirely different light from that in which the investigators saw them. The authoritarian's usual concept of himself is of a wellborn, well-bred, courteous, valiant gentleman, loyal, reliable, sturdy, etc. Although the investigators might not think a specific authoritarian individual possessed of all these attributes, the individual would usually find an explanation, as, for example, that the simple virtues of the lower middle classes — known to him as the great middle classes — are obviously superior to the profligacy of the idle rich. The authoritarian portrait of itself or of its ideal might resemble Shakespeare's portrait of Henry V, but never Coriolanus, whose opinions of himself are so often at such odds with his performance. Further evidence of non-authoritarian attitudes in Shakespeare can certainly be adduced from the sonnets, and in general from Shakespeare's productivity, complexity, subtlety, and lyric power, achievements beyond the scope of the essentially unpoetic authoritarian mind.

It seems obvious that such an interpretation as I have offered should make the play quite effective on the stage for a modern audience — except, perhaps, for one of professors. The historically-minded professors will certainly ask, How can you fit such an interpretation into our knowledge of the London stage and of the early Jacobean climate of opinion? The amount of evidence that can be offered in answer is so very large that I can do little more here than indicate its nature. First, I would cite the section of Fromm's book which discusses the social conditions which gave rise to European authoritarianism in the late middle ages and the Renaissance. Second, I would cite the complexity of philosophical, psychological, and political opinion in Elizabethan and Jacobean times as that opinion has been indicated in such recent surveys as Hiram Haydn's The Counter Renaissance, Louise C. Turner Forrest's "Caveat for Critics against Invoking Elizabethan Psychology" /3, and particularly such studies of political opinion as those of Helen C. White /4, W. Gordon Zeeveld /5, and J. W. Allen /6. Helen White has shown both how social criticism was linked with religion and how equalitarian such criticism often was. Zeeveld has shown how the ancient concept of degree as later epitomized by Ulysses' speech in Troilus and Cressida was undermined and indeed contradicted both in practice and in official theory by royal authority in the reign of Henry VIII. J. W. Allen has shown the diversity of the political thought in those times, including the persistence of non-authoritarian ideas and the rejection of the divine right of kings.

That Shakespeare's political opinion was not static but constantly developing between 1592 and 1605 has been indicated by John Danby's recent study /7, and that Ulysses' speech on degree is contradicted by the events of the play has been so well demonstrated by Johannes Kleinstück /8 that we are certainly not obliged to interpret Coriolanus as a play about the violation of degree. In

3/ PMLA, LXI (1946), 651-672.

4/ Helen C. White, Social Criticism in Popular Religious Literature of the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1941).

5/ William Gordon Zeevold, Foundations of Tudor Policy (London, 1948).

6/ J. W. Allen, English Political Thought 1603-1660 (London, 1938).

7/ John F. Danby, Shakespeare's Doctrine of Nature: A Study of King Lear (London, 1949).

8/ Johannes Kleinstück, "The Problem of Order in Shakespeare's Histories," Neophilologus, XXXVIII (1954), 268-277; and "Ulysses' Speech on Degree as Related to the Play of Troilus and Cressida," ibid., XLIII (1959), 58-63.

brief, I don't think that there was a single Elizabethan world picture, I don't believe the theory of humors or any other one psychology was dominant, I do think Shakespeare might have used direct observation in the construction of some of his characters, I deny that anyone has proof that he didn't, and I don't believe Ulysses on degree represents the political acumen of the age or anything more than that segment of political opinion which included the makers of the official mythology. If the play was produced along such lines as I have suggested in this paper, I doubt if any Jacobean audience would have taken Coriolanus for its spokesman. What, then, could have been the relationship of the play to its contemporaneous audiences? I think we can find an historically tenable solution.

Some years ago Dr. Louis B. Wright /9 pointed out the persistent mild hostility that the London middle classes felt toward the aristocracy and its assumption that it was naturally superior; Professor Alfred Harbage /10 has since demonstrated that the Globe audience was quiet, orderly, and chiefly middle class, that representatives of the upper classes were relatively few in number at any one performance, and that the lower classes seldom appeared because they could not afford to go. Now Coriolanus contains upper classes and lower, but no middle, and this fact can of course be explained from Plutarch. I suspect, however, that the absence of a middle class in his source has been put to dramaturgic use by Shakespeare. I should like to suggest that Coriolanus was written for Harbage's middle class audience, one that was somewhat apprehensive of the lower classes and their potentiality for disorder, but one that nevertheless felt more sympathy for them than for Stuart absolutism and for the rich, idle, and predatory aristocratic classes. It should be remembered that Coriolanus appeared not long after sensational enclosure riots and shortages of grain, that displaced country people had died in London streets from starvation, and that James had shocked Englishmen from the very start with his absolutist pronouncements. Although we may suppose a middle class audience more sympathetic to the lower classes than to the upper, I think it would not really have liked either; therefore in Coriolanus both lower and upper are depicted with serious failings, but the upper classes with much the worse. Professor Oscar Campbell has called the play a tragic satire. I should say rather that it is a realistic and grim satire, that the chief object of reprehension is Coriolanus, and that the play as a whole reflects — as much as official, authoritarian censorship would allow — early Jacobean stirrings of those opinions and feelings which were to grow to flood tide with the Puritan Revolution.

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9/ Louis B. Wright, Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1935).

10/ Alfred B. Harbage, Shakespeare's Audience (New York, 1941).

PSYCHIATRIST AND SAINT IN THE COCKTAIL PARTY

Whether The Cocktail Party should be asked to bear the addition of one more pebble to the mountain of commentary already heaped upon it is a nice question. It is one I shall not try to answer. I am content that Eliot's play means many things to many men. We have been interested in its poetry, its dramaturgy, its characterizations, its symbols, its myths, its theology, and its parallels to the Alcestis. What is also obvious about The Cocktail Party is that it contains more overt and explicit psychologizing than do any of Eliot's other plays. Here we have a temptation for the psychology-minded reader, and I am not going to resist it. Although Mr. Eliot might frown and remind us that in one of his Four Quartets he classed Freudian methods along with palmistry, astrology, and "the usual pastimes and drugs," /1 I entertain a hope that to bring to this play a few insights borrowed from psychoanalysis will explain why it continues to tease our imagination. In fact, I am going to argue that in The Cocktail Party Mr. Eliot's inadequate understanding of dynamic depth psychology points up a limitation of his insight into Christianity. /2

But let us begin with the obvious. The narrative of the play, based on a double triangular situation, is easy to follow. The marriage of the childless, middle-aged couple Edward and Lavinia Chamberlayne is going on the rocks. Edward has been seeking happiness in a love affair with young Celia Coplestone; his wife has been flirting with young Peter Quilpe, and Peter's love for Celia is unreturned. Matters come to a head when Lavinia temporarily leaves her husband. Whereupon, the tangled lives of these worldlings are set upon clearer courses by the professional counsel of "a very great doctor," Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly. With his help Edward and Lavinia are adjusted toward a workable marriage; and Celia, recognizing the emptiness of her affair with Edward, discovers within herself and answers a religious vocation to enter an order of missionary nuns — a vocation which eventuates in her martyrdom. Evidently the spiritual intent of the play is to contrast

1/ In "The Dry Salvages," T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays (New York, 1950), pp. 135-36.

2/ In this paper the terms psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis and their derivatives are used virtually as synonyms. For the purpose of my central argument, differentiating these terms one from another is not relevant. Nor is it relevant or necessary here to consider the disagreements among Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Karl Menninger, etc.

secular with sacred love. Its moral is uttered by the doctor when he remarks of human existence:

> The best of a bad job is all any of us
> can make of it —
> Except, of course, the saints.

Such a dictum, to be sure, is consistent with the pronouncements Eliot has regularly made about Christianity and the modern world since his conversion to the Church of England.

It is also self-evident that Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly is pivotal to the action of the play and that he serves as Eliot's raisonneur. But what has not been so obvious to some readers is that we might begin by calling Sir Henry a psychiatrist. With Eliot's nudging, we know of course that Sir Henry sometimes behaves like the Hercules of the Alcestis. /3 Sometimes, too, he talks like a priest. Yet to be satisfied with either of the two latter labels exclusively is to be led astray by a partial truth. For Sir Henry in fact functions as a psychiatrist: he does give to emotionally disturbed persons professional counsel which helps them toward self-knowledge. The crucial role given to Sir Henry indicates on Eliot's part a recognition of how important as a guide to life depth psychology has become to us moderns. Actually, about two decades before The Cocktail Party appeared, Eliot admitted that the new psychology might have "very great utility" in reviving "truths long since known to Christianity, but mostly forgotten and ignored," and in putting them into "a form and language understandable by modern people to whom the language of Christianity is not only dead but undecipherable." /4 Out of this seed-idea, it seems, The Cocktail Party was to grow. It is also our clue that in Eliot's conception of Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly Christianity and psychoanalysis meet for their reciprocal illumination or obscuration. Our test, then, is the manner in which Sir Henry handles his cases, those of Celia and of the Chamberlaynes. About his conduct we ask two questions: how competent is he as a medical man? and how valid is he as an agent of Christian truths.

In his treatment of Celia, Sir Henry at first glance may seem to be depicted as a plausible psychiatrist and possibly a wise Christian as well. He has uncommon insight into spiritual matters. He is humble enough to recognize the limitations of his science and of his healing art. Seemingly he can distinguish — as do both the psychiatrist and the enlightened clergyman today — between the normal and the neurotic use of religion. Sir Henry demonstrates that it is never the psychiatrist's business to alter the religious practices and beliefs of his patients unless these are distorted by the patient's illness. And he is aware that psychiatric treatment may involve value judgments.

Also at first glance Celia's case seems not over-complicated. In her consultation with the doctor, Eliot is at great pains to persuade us that no pathology has gone into the making of Celia's personality or into the decision she reaches to renounce this world and its earth-bound loves. Though she is distressed by Edward Chamberlayne's lack of sufficient courage to divorce his wife and though she sees herself duped by the vanity of human wishes, Celia is neither heart-broken nor embittered. Her "honest mind" perceives that she has lost nothing but an illusion. She can, in fact, describe only two symptoms: her sense that every human being is isolated and her sense of sin. To Sir Henry she admits she would prefer to suppose something were really wrong with herself because that feeling would be easier to endure than an awareness of something wrong with the world. Indeed, Celia tells the doctor that she doubts if her case deserves serious consideration.

But when Sir Henry's response to this last remark is to call Celia a "most uncommon" patient, we begin seriously to question his medical competence. For every psychiatrist knows how routine it is for many of his patients to have such an attitude toward themselves. True, we may accept Eliot's view when he has Celia explain that her modern, liberal upbringing has taught her to disbelieve in sin — to regard sin as merely "bad form" or else as "mental kinks" or "psychological." Our doubts increase, however, as soon as Sir Henry informs Celia that she is "most unusual" to have a sense of sin. If by sense of sin Eliot means sense of guilt, then at this juncture he permits his psychiatrist to speak nonsense. Plenty of psychiatric patients are burdened, either consciously or unconsciously, with a crippling sense of guilt magnified beyond anything which their most grievous faults could merit. To be sure, psychiatrists seldom use the word sin; yet they hardly deny the reality which that word designates. Sin is what a psychiatrist deals with hourly, and he is as fully aware of the evil in human hearts as Mr. Eliot is. The psychiatrist struggles with that evil in the form of his patients' unconscious or half-conscious impulses toward hatred and destruction of themselves and of others.

For the moment, though, let us pass over the objection and grant that Eliot tries to define a sense of sin beyond what is ordinarily human and which is outside the province of psychiatry. Let us accept at face value Celia's confession that her sense of sin comes from a feeling of

> . . . emptiness, of failure
> Towards someone, or something, outside myself;
> And I feel I must . . . atone.

This insight she gained when she realized that she and Edward were strangers, each of them using the other for his own purposes merely:

3/ See T. S. Eliot, "Poetry and Drama," Atlantic Monthly, vol. 187 (Feb. 1952), p. 36. Eliot of course has not denied that Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly is a psychiatrist. See Foster Hailey, "An Interview with T. S. Eliot," New York Times, April 16, 1950, sec. II, p. 1, cols. 5-7, and p. 3, cols. 4-6. See also Robert B. Heilman, "Alcestis and The Cocktail Party," Comparative Literature, vol. 5 (Spring 1953), pp. 105-116.

4/ In The Listener of Mar. 30, 1932 — as quoted by Elizabeth Drew in her T. S. Eliot: The Design of His Poetry (New York, 1949), p. 7. Eliot's ambivalence is indicated by this, the concluding sentence from the passage quoted: "Psychology is an indispensable handmaid to theology; but I think a very poor housekeeper."

That's horrible! Can we only love
Something created by our own imagination?
Are we all in fact unloving and
unlovable?
Then one is alone, and if one is alone
Then lover and beloved are equally
unreal
And the dreamer is no more real than
his dreams.

Celia must escape such despair. She desires to be cured —

Of a craving for something I cannot find
And of the shame of never finding it.

Sir Henry tells her that she is curable but must choose her own form of treatment. In brief, if she wishes secular love, he can "reconcile" her to "the human condition"; or else she may take the way toward divine love. Celia chooses the latter.

If we are sympathetic to religion, we can agree with Eliot that there are indeed saints, persons whom nothing but sacred love will satisfy, geniuses in religion who are meant for it and called to it in single-minded devotion. Through Celia, Eliot exemplifies a text from Deuteronomy, repeated in Matthew: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment."

So a saint is made. In the two hours' traffic of the stage, Eliot tries to show how by an inward metamorphosis a worldling becomes a creature of the spirit — how Celia is "transhumanised." Yet Eliot's saint never stings us to tears, never makes us believe in the reality of her vision or in the genuineness of her renunciation. Besides the obvious reasons why she does not, I suggest some others. For one thing, Celia has never experienced nor even glimpsed what psychoanalysis would call mature love — on, if you will, a non-supernatural basis. Sir Henry fails to point out that she has had no opportunity to explore the possibilities of such love — a love which, though not "transhumanised," has its disciplines, sometimes exquisite, sometimes severe, and also has its mysteries. /5 Out of the fever and fantasies of an adulterous amour, Celia could not and did not learn that mature love is an emptiness; she could and did learn only the vanity of vanity, the vacuum of reciprocal self-deceptions.

Apparently, Eliot lacks William James's kind of interest in the varieties of religious experience. At any rate, depth psychology pretends to no formulas for inducing the religious experience or for making a saint. Perhaps Eliot wants us to regard Celia's transformation as a mystery, a mystery rising out of the ambiguous relations of good with evil. Perhaps, to Eliot, Celia's adultery is an example of the paradox of the fortunate fall, in that it enabled her to achieve sainthood. If, however, Eliot were to rest his case on the grounds that he purposed here to make saint-making a mystery, then we are disappointed that he has not made it enough of a mystery. Instead, he has psychologized it — ineptly. For, both as a psychiatrist and a spokesman for orthodox Christianity, Sir Henry should have asked a further question: was there not something neurotic which in the first place impelled the cultivated, attractive, and sensitive Celia to become enamoured of so unlikely a lover as the middle-aged, narcissistic Edward Chamberlayne? Never raising this question, Sir Henry is content to help Celia free herself from the illusions of the affair. He remains quite unconcerned with those (probably oedipal) self-deceptions which preceded it.

I submit, then, that Eliot's zeal for sacred love, his urgency to preach on "the first and great commandment," has led him into special pleading.

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In The Cocktail Party the case for secular love is presented in the marital problems of the Chamberlaynes. Since the characterization of the husband is fuller, I shall focus on Edward rather than on his wife. Seeking in his affair with Celia an escape from a boring wife, Edward encounters his crisis when, pressed to prove the genuineness of his love for Celia by divorcing his wife, he feels no longer able to decide or act for himself. His predicament exposes Edward's weaknesses and leads him to Sir Henry's consultation room. He has symptoms aplenty. His complaints about the emptiness of desire and his melancholy awareness of growing older remind us of Prufrock and Gerontion. Though he wants psychiatric help, in the doctor's presence Edward displays the usual resistance. What he calls his nervous breakdown naturally has its neurotic use: "to escape from himself — and get the better of his wife." In such a plight his former self-image is shattered, he feels lonely, and he is confused by self-deceptions. Edward has become alienated from his real self: that is, he cannot put a right value on himself; so he vacillates between thinking too well and too ill of himself. He applauds himself as a passionate lover while he brands himself as a mediocrity. The truth is that Edward is so full of love for himself that none is left over for others. His worry that he is incapable of loving disturbs Edward as much, says Sir Henry, as "the fear of impotence" disturbs "cruder men." /6 Edward exploits love to bolster his self-esteem; he wants the world to have proof that a woman loves him. As we might expect, Edward is also a passive creature; he drifted into his marriage to Lavinia; and on his honeymoon lacked initiative and decisiveness. What looked like considerateness toward his wife was not an expression of unselfishness but a mask for his passivity. He complains that she always makes him feel insignificant. In fact, Edward fears his wife and variously calls her an "angel of destruction," a "python," and an "octopus." /7

5/ For definitions and discussions of what I call "mature love" here, see books like Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate (New York, 1942) and Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York, 1956). My point is that Celia does not know what she is renouncing: she has never followed — i. e., experienced — the argument for mature love.

6/ Eliot's lack of understanding is egregious; for it is by no means only "cruder men" who may be disturbed by the "fear of impotence."

7/ Such over-charged epithets suggest that Edward has castration fears and point to an explanation of his passiveness as a lover and husband.

All of this adds up to a full-blown neurosis, and Eliot is to be congratulated on the clarity of his insight and on the fidelity with which he presents the symptoms. /8 But how does his Sir Henry, who supposedly comprehends all these things, adjust the Chamberlaynes toward a workable marriage? How, in particular, does he handle Edward?

For help in relieving a neurosis like his, Edward needs to tell his troubles to someone who can understand and sympathize. To be guided toward an image of himself more in accord with reality, he needs someone who will care about his best potentialities and rightly value what is best in him. Of course Edward must also come to recognize his weaknesses and faults and sins, and to see through his self-deceptions. He requires a psychiatrist who will make an alliance with the healthy part of Edward's personality for the purpose of defeating the unhealthy or neurotic part. To escape from the prison of self-absorption, Edward needs as a temporary support that controlled and rigorously disciplined — we might almost say scientific — love the psychiatrist must give his patients. In the re-education of his heart Edward has to be freed enough so as to learn to love others. In sum, he must come to think well of himself in a non-neurotic way if he is ever to think well — or lovingly — of others.

What Edward gets from Eliot's psychiatrist is the opposite of all this. His wanting to talk out his troubles Sir Henry at once labels "the luxury of an intimate disclosure." Very promptly Sir Henry tells him:

> Resign yourself to be the fool you are.
> That's the best advice that I can give you.

Almost the next thing Sir Henry does is to assure Edward that "humiliation" may be "an experience of incalculable value." In the consultation room, as soon as Edward starts to recall a childhood experience, Sir Henry shuts him up by remarking that such memories would be "largely fictitious." Gratuitously, he adds that to interpret Edward's dreams "would only go to flatter your vanity." When Edward says, "I am obsessed by the thought of my own insignificance," we can respect Sir Henry for refusing a quack cure by immediately flattering Edward. Yet it never dawns on this psychiatrist that his patient can stand in need of any compassion whatsoever. And when he deplores — like one who doth protest too much — "the endless struggle" of human beings "to think well of themselves," we suspect that Sir Henry himself is hipped — hipped on a theory about Christian humility. /9 For the crux of his treatment is to induce in Edward a far deeper self-contempt than the poor fellow already suffers from.

With dispatch the doctor diagnoses and prescribes. He informs the Chamberlaynes that they have much in common — "the same isolation":

> A man who finds himself incapable of loving
> And a woman who finds that no man can love her.

This fact they are directed to regard —

> . . .as the bond which holds you together,
> While still in a state of unenlightenment.
> . . . . .
> You could accuse each other of your own faults
> And so could avoid understanding each other.

No doubt, the description fits too many marriages — a shared neurosis. And of course Sir Henry is describing what psychoanalysis calls "projection." Anyhow, the prescription for the Chamberlaynes is that they reverse the proposition: each should try to understand the other, and each should accuse himself of his own faults. In sum, they are to "make the best of a bad job." Their only hope of enlightenment, Sir Henry explains cryptically, is that as this phrase is forgotten, their condition "will alter." Naturally, we cannot quarrel with the advice to try to understand one another. But love is indispensable to such understanding. /10 And though in the last act of the play (two years later), Edward and Lavinia display considerateness toward each other, Sir Henry never expresses any hope that they will learn to love. Indeed, he could not: because the other half of his advice makes self-accusation — even, as we have seen with Edward, self-contempt — a foundation-stone for marriage. What Eliot's psychiatrist misses is that self-accusation, through projection, can be an excellent weapon against an enemy — or a spouse.

Again we find Eliot engaged in special pleading. In truth, his conception of Christian love is strangely limited. We recall that, according to Matthew, when Jesus defined sacred love, he was being quizzed by a sharp, pharasaical lawyer who hoped to confound him. Hence the Master's precision when he followed his definition of the first commandment with these words: "And the second is like unto it, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." In Jesus' teaching that we are to love our neighbors as we love ourselves, we have no corollary like Eliot's preachment of self-contempt. On this point the wisdom of Christianity and the wisdom of psychoanalysis join. The psychoanalyst knows that as self-hatred grows the ability to love dies. Sir Henry does not know this.

His trouble — like Eliot's and yours and mine — began in Eden. I mean of course original sin. For Eliot, it is a dogma, to be maintained with intellectual rigor. To the non-orthodox Christian, original sin points to a psychological and moral truth about our drives toward destruction. Why Eliot so insists upon the dogma or why — granted that pride heads the list of the seven deadly sins — Eliot makes his psychiatrist so eager to annihilate Edward Chamberlayne's petty vanities, I leave you to decide. Until Eliot's biography is written we can have no sure answer. I suspect, however, that Eliot's sense of original sin, his worry over self-love and

8/ This is not to deny that Eliot's insight into neuroses is pretty shallow.

9/ Very probably it is the insistence on Christian humility which causes Sir Henry to congratulate Celia when, for her doubts that her case deserves serious medical attention, he calls her "most uncommon."

10/ We knew this long before Freud of course. As Goethe once remarked, "A man does not learn to understand anything unless he loves it."

pride, his personal reticence, and the overplus of intellectuality in his poems and plays and in his Christianity /11 — all these, I suspect, are related to one another in his hidden heart. Literary history sees in Eliot a revolt from the romantic tradition and can explain his banishment of romantic extravagance as well as our relish in the irony with which Eliot riddles emotional sloppiness. /12 Yet we can also read in Eliot's works the biography of his inner life /13 — at least enough of it to find a man who distrusts emotion, who would not or could not commit his heart to the ties of human love. It is true that in The Cocktail Party, when Celia must choose between sacred and profane love, Sir Henry tells her that "Neither way is better. Both ways are necessary." But we know this comes from his head, not his heart. /14 A few moments later he worries about the domestic life the Chamberlaynes have gone back to:

> To the stale food mouldering in the larder,
> The stale thoughts mouldering in their minds.
> Each unable to disguise his own meanness
> . . . . .
> Mirror to mirror, reflecting vanity.

Not until The Elder Statesman do we meet a different Eliot. Possibly, future readers will find this, his most recent play, more appealing as a biographical document than as a work of art. Here, for the first time, is the tenderness which has always been missing from Eliot's plays and poems. The heart-warming love of Monica and Charles reveals a new and kindlier view of human nature. Here Eliot suggests that in a human relationship, which those of us who are neither saints nor martyrs can share, there may be a way out of the valley of the hollow men. To trust oneself, to trust that self in another person, is to break down the bars of self-isolation. Such a surrender of the heart requires the act of faith which the elder statesman, Lord Claverton, makes when he declares:

> If a man has one person, just one in his life,
> To whom he is willing to confess everything
> . . . . . .
> Then he loves that person, and his love will save him.

So the mask of Gerontion has dropped. All homage to Eliot that in his green old age he has come upon this truth! The pity is that he did not find it sooner.

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11/ To be sure, I am not suggesting that Eliot's poetry lacks emotion — or more particularly that his religious poetry lacks emotion. These are matters of degree. I am merely pointing to the degree of emphasis upon intellectuality in Eliot's Christianity. It is explicit in his The Idea of a Christian Society (London, 1939). Consider this, for instance, on p. 8, op. cit.: "We must treat Christianity with a great deal more intellectual respect than is our wont; we must treat it as being for the individual primarily a matter of thought and not of feeling.

12/ Especially useful on this point is ch. I, "The Individual Explosion," in Grover Smith, Jr., T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays (University of Chicago Press, 1956).

13/ See Leon Edel's interesting sketch in Literary Biography (New York, 1959), pp. 70-89.

14/ See Gerald Weales, "The Latest Eliot," an essay-review of The Elder Statesman, in the Kenyon Review, vol. 21 (Summer 1959), pp. 473-478.

BOOK REVIEW

Norman Kiell — The Adolescent Through Fiction: A Psychological Approach. New York: International Universities Press. Pp. 345+xv. $5.00

Both the student of science and the student of the humanities will applaud Dr. Norman Kiell's successful "attempt to bridge the two great regions of psychology and literature, where the study of human personality dwells." Designed as a textbook for students of psychology, The Adolescent Through Fiction accomplishes the fusion of two disciplines in a way that may well serve as a model and an inspiration to those who would enrich their areas of specialization by broadening rather than by narrowing, by synthesis rather than by multiplication of details.

Dr. Kiell, a member of the faculty of Brooklyn College, has based a full-length study of adolescence upon a thesis suggested by Sigmund Freud and reiterated, with various degrees of emphasis and development, by authorities in the field of adolescent psychology from the time of G. Stanley Hall. The aim of the work is to humanize the study of psychology and to demonstrate to the student that parallels exist between the scientific account of human nature and those accounts which spring from the insights and intuitions of great authors. Literature and psychology can be and should be complementary studies, and novels, organic works of art which present unified characters in action, offer to the student rich and varied fields for exploration. The perception and invention of the artist; the economy, distillation, unity, and style of the work of art; the intensification and order to be found in the novelist's projection of life — all these are combined in fiction that can illuminate the facts with which psychology deals, and these facts in turn can illuminate the work of art. While demonstrating the fellowship of the two disciplines, Dr. Kiell carefully guards the integrity of each: "Literature is not watered-down psychology, nor is psychology methodized literature." The complementary functions of the two fields can produce the most stimulating insights and understandings precisely where there are limitations to the use of the novel for scientific purposes.

Bringing to his work a thorough knowledge

of his field of study, a wide background of reading, and ability to write lucidly, the author of The Adolescent Through Fiction achieves his aim by a method which he describes as an attempt "to set down some of the dynamic principles of adolescent psychology and illuminate these concepts by illustrations from good contemporary fiction." The work deals with nine areas of adolescent growth, each of which is clearly and adequately explained in text that has been authenticated according to the methods of careful scholarship. Complementing the explanatory sections are generous excerpts from fiction; from forty-two novels there are fifty-four selections, many of them extending to ten or fifteen pages. Dr. Kiell, while acknowledging the existence of many excellent depictions of adolescence to be found in the older novels, has confined his choices (with one or two exceptions) to the literature of the last half century, which offers more than plenitude. He comments on the spate of novels about adolescence that has been increasing since the time of Romain Rolland's Jean-Christophe (contemporaneous with Hall's Adolescence) and on one of the salient facts of the history of the modern novel: the increasing use that novelists have made of the materials of the various branches of psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology.

From the first selection from A High Wind in Jamaica (The Innocent Voyage) depicting physical change to the illustrations of the attainment of adulthood drawn from D. H. Lawrence and Anthony West, the complementary sections shed light on whatever aspect of adolescent development they are chosen to illuminate. Instead of the wooden, exaggerated adolescents usually found in case histories, believable and memorable characters — living characters — are presented in all their complexity to students who would understand the secrets of adolescent personality. It must be admitted that the case-history adolescent is not confined to the textbooks; he appears all too often in the fiction of the day. However, Dr. Kiell has excluded all such characters from his selections, and furthermore, he has avoided a danger that might have been inherent in his method. The Adolescent Through Fiction is not a patchwork, because the author has interwoven his fictional excerpts and explanatory sections by means of comments on the passages chosen or on the novel as a whole.

Although there are a few novels on the list of fictional excerpts (Appendix D) that are somewhat sentimental, derivative, or merely popular, the student of literature will view the list with pleasure. It includes works by such masters as Thomas Mann, André Gide, James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence; established writers such as H. G. Wells, Somerset Maugham, Thomas Wolfe, James T. Farrell; a number of authors whose main distinction lies in their representation of adolescence — Floyd Dell, William Maxwell; and some of the able novelists, such as James Baldwin, who have made their reputations during the last decade. And if the student of literature is inclined to regret the omission of favorite authors (Sherwood Anderson, William Faulkner, Carson McCullers), he will first recall that the novels were chosen for particular purposes and then review Dr. Kiell's tolerant statement that the text very easily admits substitutions from a field in which the range of choice is wide indeed.

The extreme breadth of the field is indicated by the selective, not exhaustive, list of 480 novels from world literature, published between 1900 and 1958, which deal exclusively or in part with the adolescent. The novels, in all of which the author finds some merit, are admittedly highly uneven in literary quality. When so much is given in the useful appendices, it is perhaps ungenerous to suggest that annotation to serve as a guide to students who will inevitably wish to extend their reading would greatly enhance the value of Appendix A. Appendix B is a bibliography of 416 books and articles on psychology and literature, which will be of great help to students of both disciplines [see IX, 2, 24], and Appendix C is a comprehensive list of textbooks on adolescence. The work is indexed, the format is attractive, and provocative quotations, chosen from writers from the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries, introduce the chapters. Students of The Adolescent Through Fiction will find a great deal of enjoyment is mastering the fundamentals of adolescent psychology, and even more lies near at hand for those who take advantage of the greater wealth to which the author points the way.

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OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

Comment here does not preclude fuller review in a later issue.

Coleridge's Writings on Shakespeare, ed. by Terence Hawkes, with an Introduction by Alfred Harbage. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (Capricorn Books), 1959. Pp. 256 (including a brief bibliography). Paper, $1.35; cloth, $2.50.

An invaluable collection of the outstanding critical writings of a truly great critic. Professor Harbage in his Introduction, questions quietly (perhaps a bit too quietly for the present writer) the prevalent tendency in Shakespeare criticism to elevate a single school of critical opinion into a body of inviolable dogma. We avail ourselves of the privilege of rather liberal quotation:

> The somewhat contradictory complaints, that it [Coleridge's Shakespeare criticism] is too derivative and too subjective, are often supplemented by a third, that it blurs the distinction between dramatic characters and actual human beings. The issue had been debated among English critics before Coleridge joined their ranks. Reviewers had remarked, with some justice, that William Richardson in his 'psychological' analysis of Shakespeare's characters forgot he was dealing with literature. But Morgann had maintained earlier that his characters are 'essentially different

> from those drawn by other writers' because he used indirect means, implying the existence of parts not seen, conveying impressions of roundness and reality until the characters could be viewed 'rather as historic than dramatic beings.' There is point in this: we come to know Shakespeare's characters as we come to know actual persons, through disparate details and our own inferences, so that the inferences have a peculiar relevance. In a letter of July 12, 1802, Coleridge had said of Shakespeare's special art, "It is easy to clothe imaginary beings with our own thoughts and feelings, but to send ourselves out of ourselves, to think ourselves into the thoughts and feelings of beings in circumstances wholly and strangely different from our own — hoc labor, hoc opus — and who has achieved it? Perhaps only Shakespeare. . . .'
>
> His remark that "Polonius is the personified memory of wisdom no longer possessed," and again, "Polonius is the skeleton of his own former skill and statecraft,' is, says Professor Wellek, a confusion 'since a fictional character has no past beyond the statements of the author.' But what constitutes 'statements'? Polonius is respected by everyone in the play except Hamlet, and, as a king's counsellor, presumably rose to that rank. Carried to its logical extreme Professor Wellek's kind of objection would compel us to say that Lear cannot be old, because as a fictional character, he has never been young.
> (Introduction, pp. 22-23.)

John Dewey: Dictionary of Education, ed. by Ralph Winn, with a Foreword by John Herman Randall, Jr. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. x+150. $3.75.

The title is somewhat misleading. The alpabetical arrangement of "apothegms . . . too full of suggestion and wisdom to be left buried in the discursive pages in which they are embedded" (Professor Randall's Foreword, p. vi) covers a range of subjects far greater than what is usually thought of as Dewey's "educational philosophy." As examples we submit the following, from Dewey's Art as Experience:

> Works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in the world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience.
>
> We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes the processes the artist went through in producing the work. It is the critic's privilege to share in the promotion of this active process.

We again call attention to the recent Capricorn Books reprint of Art as Experience [see IX, 1, 14].

Karin Dovring — Road of Propaganda: The Semantics of Biased Communication, with an Introduction by Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 158 (including notes; no index). $4.75.

The author, who is identified as "a Swedish scholar [and] journalist . . . now Visiting Professor at the International University of Social Studies, Pro Deo, Rome," relies heavily on American authorities in psychology and sociology, probably most heavily upon the author of the Introduction, Professor Lasswell.

Wladimir G. Eliasberg — Psychotherapy and Society. Psychotherapy for the Many and the Few. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. xviii+223 (including six appendices, a 13-page bibliography, and index). $6.00.

William Golding — Lord of the Flies, with a biographical and critical note by E. L. Epstein. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (Capricorn Books), 1959. (Originally published by Coward-McCann, 1955.) Paper, $1.25.

Elsewhere in this issue, Dr. Childers comments favorably on the use of High Wind in Jamaica (The Innocent Voyage) as an illustration of adolescent development. Mr. Golding, in Lord of the Flies, has combined fantasy and the bitterest stark realism in order to depict the full panoply of phylogenetic development in psychodynamic terms. What a rich mine it would have offered to Dr. Kiell in his study of the adolescent through fiction!

Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, edrs. — Faulkner in the University. Class Conferences at the University of Virginia, 1957-1958. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 294 (including index). $6.00.

"From February to June of 1957 and 1958," write the Editors, "William Faulkner was Writer-in-Residence at the University of Virginia . . . . During these periods. . .[he] held thirty-seven group conferences [the groups ranged from undergraduate and graduate courses, general public and university groups, to the staff of the Department of Psychiatry in the Medical School] and an uncounted number of individual and office meetings with students and staff of the University. He encouraged groups to ask questions about his writing and indeed about anything, which resulted in his answering publicly over two thousand queries on everything from spelling to the nature of man." Mr. Faulkner himself warns "That these are questions answered without rehearsal or preparation, by a man old enough in the craft of the human heart to have learned that there are no definitive answers to anything, yet still young enough in spirit to believe that truth may still be found provided one seeks enough, tests and discards, and still tries again." (Preface, pp. vii-viii.)

With these caveats in mind, and also considering that this book has been reviewed in the press fully enough (notably, for instance, by Carvel Collins in the New York Times Book Review) to make a full report here unnecessary, we limit ourselves to two questions and answers which may be of special interest to our readers. On May 15, 1957, at a session for the University and Community Public, the first reported question and answer were the following:

> . . . Q. Mr. Faulkner, I saw something not long ago that took The Sound and Fury [sic] in four sections and tried to draw a parallel between the id, the ego and super-ego and the author's person. [The question seems

to refer to Carvel Collins' "A Conscious Use of Freud," published by us in III, 3, 2-4, and, in expanded form, as an English Institute Essay for 1952.] Now don't you think that is indicative of what a lot of critics and scholars are doing today with the views of contemporary writers, making psychological inferences and finding symbols which the author never intended?

A. Well, I would say that the author didn't deliberately intend but I think that in the same culture the background of the critic and the writer are so similar that a part of each one's history is the seed which can be translated into the symbols which are standardized within that culture. That is, the writer doesn't have to know Freud to have written things which anyone who does know Freud can divine and reduce into symbols. And so when the critic finds these symbols, they are of course there. But they were there as inevitably as the critic should stumble on his own knowledge of Freud to discern symbol [sic]. But I think the writer is primarily concerned in telling about people, in the only terms he knows, which is out of his experience, his observation, and his imagination. And the experience and the imagination and the observation of a culture are — all the people in that culture partake of the same three things more or less. The critic has a valid part in any culture. I think that it's — it might be a good thing if most writers were like me and didn't bother to read them. That is, the writer knows what is in his book and he knows whether it failed or didn't fail. It — and so it's possible that reading the criticisms could do a young writer harm because it would confuse him, it could get him to think in terms of the symbolism which the critic, who is usually a good deal more erudite than the writer, can find in his work.

(Pp. 147-148.)

Elsewhere (p. 268) Faulkner asserted that he had no idea where he learned psychology.

. . . Only what I have learned about it from listening to people that do know. What little of psychology I do know the characters I have invented and playing poker have taught me. Freud I'm not familiar with.

Your Editor asked Professor Collins to comment on these quotations. His reply included the following paragraph (October 19, 1959):

I think it might be well to use, as you suggest, the long quote from Faulkner in the University (pointing up that the questioner is wild in thinking the article "drew a parallel" between id, etc. "and the author's person" — whatever that meant). As for the shorter quote, about Faulkner's not knowing Freud, let me assure you that he is an omnivorous reader and does know Freud. . . .

Professor Collins goes on to cite facts and circumstances. But for these our readers will have to be patient until they are more fully set forth in the sourcebook in psycho-literary criticism which is now in preparation.

Graham Hough — The Dark Sun: A Study of D. H. Lawrence. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (Capricorn Books), 1959. (Original copyright date, 1956). Pp. iv + 265 (with notes and index). Paper, $1.25.

The brilliant author of The Last Romantics systematically considers Lawrence's place as a novelist, discusses each of the major novels in detail, analyzes the tales and the poems, and then concludes with an attempt to distil from the body of the author's works a statement of "doctrine" on fiction and philosophy, other leading ideas, practical applications, the "quarrel with Christianity," and other conclusions. Mr. Hough's gifts as a scholar and critic are formidable. Yet it seems rather odd to the present writer that, holding as he does certain definite reservations concerning at least one of Lawrence's central ideas: the necessity of depicting sexual relations, even sexual intercourse, with the same impartiality which would go, let us say, into a Dickens description of a Christmas dinner, Mr. Hough should have felt that he was an appropriate critic for the works of Lawrence. Such reservations, exemplified by the following comment on a scene from The Rainbow, are repeated frequently.

As for physical passion, Lawrence's equivalents for it are often factitious, tortured and inflated; of course, no one should try to present it as he does, and traditional literary good sense has always known it.

(P. 63, emphasis is ours.)

Hough admits that "no one has ever got so near the bone in presenting the experience of two people of different sexes living together in one house," but he seems to prefer it when Lawrence uses less direct means, "scraps of dialogue, the close imaginative following of changine trains of feeling, a fiery fidelity to the actual which transcends all conventional views of what men, women and marriage are like" (ibid.).

Richard B. Hovey — John Jay Chapman — An American Mind. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 391 (including sources and notes, a select bibliography, and index). $6.50.

Through an odd coincidence, several of the participants in this year's program of G. T. 10 are represented by newly-published books. In each case the author writes genuine and valuable literary criticism, and in each case he brings to that criticism an astonishingly broad range of interests, competency, and learning. Dr. Hovey, for example, places Chapman in the literary ambiance of his age and of ours, but he also uses in his investigation an unobtrusive familiarity with history, economic theory, sociology, and, what is of course most interesting to us, depth psychology.

And indeed a study of Chapman, to be anywhere near definitive, requires all of these ancillary points of approach, the last-named most of all. For the inescapable fact is, as Dr. Hovey points out in his Preface, that "as

a self-mutilator Chapman outdid Vincent van Gogh — a piece of sensationalism at which it is easier to stop and stare than to press on towards the understanding it requires," and that the most crucial period of Chapman's intellectual and emotional development is the period of almost ten years which he spent as a physical and psychic invalid. Dr. Hovey's description of the symptomatology shows such clinical accuracy as to require no formal diagnosis; yet it is free from all clinical "jargon":

> His fortieth year and retirement . . .mark a change in Chapman's career. It took him nearly a decade to recover from the physical and nervous collapse he suffered. . . . still in bed, tormented by wild imaginings, under the delusion that he had lost the use of his legs. With his knees drawn up under his chin, Chapman's position was like that of a baby in the womb.
>
> . . . . .
>
> What he must have suffered is painful to contemplate. 'At night I often felt like Poe's man in "The Pit and the Pendulum",' he later wrote of the experience. 'I must lie perfectly still while the circular saw or swinging scythe filed the core of me. If I resisted I destroyed myself. Some of those midnights were unforgettable. In the early morning the dim light that came in a slit above the roller shade smote me like a mace and waked me to pain.' It was his season in hell. (p. 159.)

Dr. Hovey always shows that he is painfully aware of the shortcomings of the glib and facile type of psychoanalytic biography. Yet at this point, as well as in his account of some of the difficulties of Chapman's earlier years as a child and young adult, he does not shirk the task of dynamic explanation. He gives a full account of the precipitating incidents which led to the later collapse, including Chapman's own diagnosis of "too much will and self-will"; then he bravely plunges in with his own analysis:

> Guilt like Chapman's might have originated in hostility towards his father. A scrupulous conscience can forbid such animosity but cannot destroy it. Conscience can only condemn that feeling to chains and the dungeon — bury it so deep that it may never return to the waking memory. Something like this must have happened to the mind and heart of Chapman. For in a lifetime this man who produced paragraphs by the thousands wrote scarcely four about his own father. Evidently, even before the actual death of Chapman, Sr., he was already dead in the thoughts of his son. And as everyone knows, the wish is father to the thought. Chapman, then, must have wished for the death of his father. We rightly say that such criminality is unthinkable, and that is why we confine the criminal to his dungeon. But when the severe judge works powerfully (as did Chapman's conscience) to keep the murderous criminal chained, the psyche where this conflict rages is so agonized by guilt as to demand a towering penance. (p. 161.)

Dr. Hovey then goes on to corroborate the surmise by his account of Chapman's writing, shortly after the period of his illness, of an essay on his old schoolmaster, Dr. Coit of St. Paul's School (a literary device by which father-hatred is displaced to an obvious but powerful father-surrogate), an essay which the biographer characterizes as "a curious mixture of love and hate, of attraction and fearful repulsion."

But limited quotation cannot do justice to this fine piece of critical biography. Again and again it suggests to the reader overtones of comparison with Lincoln Steffens' Autobiography. But Steffens never had the aid of a psychologically trained critic; hence there is much in his mentally confused rationalizations which is not to be found in this account of his equally tortured but much more distinguished contemporary.

Nathan Masor — The New Psychiatry. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. viii+ 155 (with bibliography and subject and author indexes). $3.75.

Byron D. Murray — Commonwealth of Americans: A Search for the Missing Chapters in Our Story. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 219 (with notes and index). $3.75

We wonder what makes this publisher send us all his anti-Freudian books, even when they have little or no connection with literary criticism. If we say that we are not convinced, that will probably be imputed to prejudice. Yet we think that even the most casual inspection of these works will absolve us from that imputation. The present one tilts against all "materialistic" interpretations of history and human conduct in the name of neo-orthodox Christianity. The analysis of what Americans read, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, illustrates the shortcomings of "criticism" which is always a form of special pleading.

Herbert Read — The Nature of Literature. (Published in England as Collected Essays in Literary Criticism.) New York: Grove Press, 1958. Pp. 380 (with index). Evergreen Paperback E-92, $1.95.

The epigraph for the present issue is taken from the central essay in this collection, "The Nature of Criticism." None of the essays, with the exception of the Introduction, seems to have been written later than 1936; those taken from the author's Reason and Romanticism go back to 1926. There are eight brilliant little papers on "The Nature of Poetry" and thirteen particular studies of authors ranging from Froissart to Henry James.

Since Sir Herbert can surely lay claim to being one of the pioneers in psycho-literary criticism, we take the opportunity to quote his own account of his decision to adopt the position which we try to represent:

> The scientific temper of our age is not necessarily one with which the artist, and the critic representing the artist, need compromise. Art and science have always been independent methods of discovering and presenting the truth. But once a department of

science was established with the mind itself as its subject, a new situation was created. For the scientist could not for long explore this realm without coming into contact with, and having to accommodate, those products of the human mind which we call works of art. Psychology, that is to say, impinges directly on the province of the literary critic — raids it and despoils it and leaves a sorry desolation of unconscious prejudices. It has been my contention that in this situation the critic must retaliate, and pick from the science of psychology his brightest weapons. I have been gradually drawn towards a psychological type of literary criticism because I have realized that psychology, more particularly the method of psycho-analysis, can offer explanations of many problems connected with the personality of the poet, the technique of poetry, and the appreciation of the poem. The full extent to which I have developed this type of criticism is not represented in this volume — I must refer readers to my studies of Wordsworth (Faber, 1949) and Shelley (Heineman, 1936) for more adequate essays in this manner. But over the fifteen years in which the essays now collected were written, my tendency, s t e p b y s t e p with my increasing knowledge of modern psychology, has been to give literary criticism a psychological direction.

I admit that there still remains a more indulgent activity which deserves the name of criticism. Much as I dislike the idea of 't a s t e' (for the good taste of one generation is the bad taste of the next, and in time even the bad taste of a period becomes the 'chic' of a later age) there is nevertheless a c e r t a i n exchange of appreciative gestures which is part of the civilized behaviour of a society. Every occasion we have for expressing our admiration or detestation of a poet or a painter is not necessarily an occasion for an analysis. We can float on the surface of a subject and still be aware of its depths. I do not wish, therefore, to make the psychological method in criticism the only method; I only wish to establish its relevance, and to suggest that under its guidance most of our literary judgements must proceed to a court of revision.

(Introduction, pp. 13-14.)

Dagobert D. Runes — Pictorial History of Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. x+406 (large size, with 2 pages of picture credits, 2 of general acknowledgments, and an index). $15.00.

George Bernard Shaw — The Adventures of the Black Girl in Her Search for God. (With the original illustrations by John Farleigh.) New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons (Capricorn Books), 1959. (Originally published in 1933.) Pp. 96. Paper, $.95; cloth, $2.50.

A beautiful, convenient, and inexpensive reprint of the twentieth century Candide.

Christopher Trent — Terms Used in Archaeology: A Short Dictionary. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959 (but printed in Great Britain). Pp. 62. $2.75.

William Wasserstrom — Heiress of All the Ages. Sex and Sentiment in the Genteel Tradition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959. Pp. xi+157 (including notes and index). $4.00.

A full review of this closely-packed book will have to be postponed until the next issue. As a foretaste, however, note some of the provocative chapter-titles: "Steel-Engraving Ladies and Gibson Girls," "The Lily and the Prairie Flower," "The Spirit of Myrrha" (noticed by us when it first appeared as an article in Psychoanalysis), "Nymph and Nun," "Sugar and Spice," And the epigraph to the chapter "Fortune's Darlings," taken from the autobiography of the Duke of Windsor:

> In character Wallis was and still remains, complex and elusive, and from the first I looked upon her as the most independent woman I had ever met. This refreshing trait of American women I was inclined to put down as one of the happier outcomes of the event of 1776.

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1. *-Joseph Prescott, "The Characterization of Stephen Dedalus in Ulysses," Letteratura moderne (Bologna), IX, 2 (Mar-Apr 59), 145-163.

   *- - - - - -, "Seven Letters from Dorothy M. Richardson," Yale Univ Lib Gazette, 33, 3 (Jan 59), 102-111. [Refers to Professor Prescott's Encyclopedia Britannica article on D M R, preprinted by us in IV, 1 [Feb 54], 4-5. See also VIII, 4, 62.]

2. *-Gordon Ross S m i t h, "Iago the Paranoiac," Amer Imago, 16, 2 (Sum 59), 155-167. (Your Editor will try to arrange a discussion of this paper by other Shakespeareans who have recently written on Othello.)

   *- - - - - -, "Brutus, Virtue, and Will," Shkspr Qtrly, X, 3 (Sum 59), 367-379.

3. &-John Chynoweth Burnham, "The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the U n i t e d States," Amer Imago, 13, 1 (Spr 56), 65-68.

4. *-Harry Slochower, "Incest in The Brothers Karamazov," ibid, 16, 2 (Sum 59), 127-145.

5. *-John D. Mitchell, "André Gide, Rebel and Conformist," ibid, 147-153.

6. &-Albin R. Gilbert, "Intentionalism," Jrnl Psy, 48 (1959), 181-190.

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From Recent Journals

Because of our neglect of the psychological journals in recent issues, caused as always by lack of space, we shall enter some of them first in this issue.

From Contemporary Psychology, Vol. IV (59):

&- Elizabeth R. Zetzel, "The Early Mother-Child Relationship: A New Conception," 2 (Feb), 38-39, reviews:

&-Melanie Klein. Envy and Gratitude: A Study of Unconscious Sources. New York: Basic Books, 57.

&-Harold G. McCurdy, "La Caractérologie Positive," ibid, 47-48, reviews:

&-Marcel Boll and Francis Baud. La personnalité: sa structure, son comportement. Paris: Masson et cie, 58.

An advertisement (ibid, 61) for a journal published in Japan reveals the following:

&-E[rich] Fromm, "Zen and psychoanalysis," Psychologia, 1, 4 (Dec 58).

In the listing of Books Received (ibid, 64) there appears:

&- E. H. Erikson. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. New York: W. W. Norton, 58. (This book will be reviewed for us early in 1960.)

%- William Douglas, "A Wise Man and a Young Science," 3 (Mar), 72-75, reviews the seven volumes which have appeared thus far of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, to be completed in 18 or more volumes. The Editorial Committee includes Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard Adler; translations by R. F. C. Hull. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. New York: Pantheon Press.

&-John T. Metcalf, "Psychology in the Encyclopedias," 4 (Apr), 97-105, discusses the coverage on psychology in recent editions of four major encyclopedias, British and American. Interesting sidelights include facsimile reproductions of material from the Britannica of 1773, among them the following:

> 4. Psychology, which is the fourth part of metaphysics, and consists in the knowledge of the soul in general, and the soul of man in particular, concerning which, the most profound, the most subtle and abstract researches have been made, that the human reason is capable of producing; and concerning the substance of which, in spite of all these efforts, it is yet extremely difficult to assert any thing that is rational, and still less any thing that is positive and well-supported.

Dr. Metcalf's review, commenting on the coverage of psychoanalysis in recent editions of the Britannica, refers to "the article...on Freud's influence on art and literature by F. J. Hoffman...." (101).

%-Urie Bronfenbrenner, "In Dispraise of Fact" (a most misleading title), ibid, 114-115, reviews:

*- Helen Merrell Lynd. On Shame and the Search for Identity. New York: Harcourt Brace, 58.

Quotations from this review and from the book itself, which may well escape the attention of our readers, are decidedly in order:

> ...The methods and values which she [Mrs. Lynd] employs and applauds are, in this reviewer's judgment, less those of science, or even of social philosophy than of literary criticism. ... She states (p. 125):
>
> > In an effort to establish themselves as sciences, psychology, early psychoanalysis, and in some areas the social sciences have emphasized tight thinking, analogies from the physical sciences, unambiguous data, and methods of minute precision. It is possible that at present certain kinds of understanding can come about only through the risks involved in "loose thinking."... Some phenomena can be more truly described in larger and more flexible terms than in more minute and unyielding ones. Shame and a sense of identity are among the phenomena that must be reached in part through such methods.
>
> Accordingly, believing that "a language that is ... confined to denotation at the expense of connotation does not have the means of expressing experiences whose nature includes ambiguity and surplus meaning," Mrs. Lynd turns to literature as the principal basis for analyzing the concepts of shame and identity.... From a fascinating survey of references to shame and guilt principally in the Bible, in Shakespeare, and in Russian, English, and American novelists..., she arrives at the conclusion that, unlike guilt, shame involves "a sudden awareness of the incongruity between oneself and the social situation" through "awareness of transcultural values beyond one's society." "Shame," she asserts, "is doubt, including a diffused anxiety, an overall ashamedness, a consciousness of the whole self, a feeling that life is happening to the individual." In these ways it is different from guilt, which "is more related to specific acts, going against specific taboos." And, above all, it is shame rather than guilt which permits the development of a sense of "identity." (114)

&-Ernest R. Hilgard in an editorial (CP Speaks, 5 [May], 142) comments on the Darwin centennial, making an interesting parallel between Darwin and Lamarck, Freud and Jung.

In the listing of Books Received (ibid, 160) there appears:

&-N. O. Brown. Life against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History. Middletown. Conn.: Wesleyan Univ Press, 1959. (This book will be reviewed for us early in 1960.)

&-M. Brewster Smith, "Murphy's Novum Organum," 6 (June), 161-164, reviews:

&-Gardner Murphy. Human Potentialities. New York: Basic Books, 58.

&-Calvin S. Hall, "Somnio Ergo Sum," ibid 164-165, reviews:

&-Bertram D. Lewin. Dreams and the Uses of Regression. (Freud Anniversary Lectures.) New York: Int Univ Press, 58.

&-Leonard D. Eron, "But Which Is Fact and Which Theory?" ibid, 165-166, reviews:

&-Ives Henrick. Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis (3rd ed). New York: Alfred Knopf, 58.

&-Robert W. White, "Can Psychoanalysis Provide a Sense of Identity?" ibid, 167-169, reviews:

&-Allen Wheelis. The Quest for Identity. New York: W. W. Norton, 58.

For our readers, by far the most interesting review in any issue thus far of Contemporary Psychology is

*Roger Brown's review ("Humbert's Idiography") of Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita, ibid, 172-174.

The analysis of Nabokov's extraordinary use of language, structurally and dynamically, in this most controversial of recent novels, is almost as startling as the novel itself.

Psychological Abstracts report the following

In 32, 1 (Feb 58):

&-René Laforgue, "Freud et son génie," Acta psychther, psychsom, orthopaed, 4 (56) 265-274.

&-Olaf Brüel, "Zur Feier von . . .Freuds hunderdstem Geburtstag," ibid, 275-280.

&-Enrique Racker, "Algunas consideraciones sobre la personalidad de Freud," Rev psa (Buenos Aires), 13 (56), 246-253.

%-Eric Berne, "The Psychological Structure of Space with Some Remarks on Robinson Crusoe," Psa Q, 25 (56), 549-567.

*-René Bonnot, "Le roman du temps. A propos de Virginia Woolf et James Joyce," J psy norm path, 53 (56), 454-472.

*-Helmer Ringgren, "Dieu, le temps et le d e s t i n dans les épopées Parsanes," ibid, 407-423.

&-Edward Bullough. Aesthetics: Lectures and Essays. Stanford Univ Press, 57.

*-J. L. Henderson, "Stages of Psychological Development Exemplified in the Poetical Works of T. S. Eliot," Jnl analyt psy, 2 (57), 33-49 (last of a series).

&-Leo Lowenthal. Literature and the Image of Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 57. [Lope de Vega, Calderon, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Corneille, Racine, Molière, Ibsen, Hamsun, Goethe.]

*-Hans J. Kleinschmidt, "The Death of Elpenor: On a Distinct Type of Self-destructive Reaction in a Rejected Youth," Jl Hillside Hosp, 5 (56), 320-327.

In 32, 2 (Apr 58):

&-Igor A. Caruso, "Zum Problem des Übels in der Tiefenpsychologie," Jb Psy Psychother, 4 (56), 79-91.

&-Erling Eng, "Freud and the Changing Present," Ant Rev, Win 56-57, 459-468.

*-Annemarie Dührssen, "Lebensproblem und Daseinskrise bei Hamlet und Ophelia," Ztschr psysom Med, 2(56), 220-235; 295-311.

&-Diego García Reinoso, "Notas sobre la obesidad a través del estudio de Falstaff," Rev psa, Buenos Aires, 13 (56), 170-177.

*-Marion Milner, "Der Sinn im Sinnlosen: Freud und der 'Hiob' von Blake," Psyche, Heidelberg, 10 (57), 688-713 [originally in English in New Era, London, Jan 56].

In 32, 3 (June 58):

&-Joost A. M. Meerloo, "Kos against Knidos: Ambivalence as the Psychiatric Outlook on Man," Jl Hillside Hosp, 6 (57), 67-86.

*-William G. Niederland, "The Symbolic River—Sister Equation in Poetry and Folklore," ibid, 91-99.

&-Theodore Thass—Thienemann, "Oedipus and the Sphinx: The Linguistic Approach to Unconscious Fantasies," Psa Rev, 44 (57), 10-33.

*-R. Campbell, "Du fantastique," Ann med psy, 1 (56), 5, 788-804.

&-Arye Soleh, "The Social-Psychological Basis in Dostoevsky's Writings" (transl of Hebrew title), Ofakim, 10 (56), 295-300.

*-Zvi Zohar, "Dostoevsky as Seen by the Father of Psychoanalysis" (transl of Hebrew title), ibid, 290-294.

&-Wolfgang Kretschmer, Jr., "Das aesthetische Problem in der Psychotherapie," Ztschr Psyther med Psy, 7 (57), 48-52.

In 32, 4 (Aug 58):

*-N. N. Dracoulides, "Tracé psychanalytique sur Hamlet de Shakespeare," Psyché, Paris, 11 (56), 129-155.

&-Enrique Racker, "'Laventana indiscreta' [Rear Window]: Glosas psicoanalíticas sobre una película," Rev psa, Buenos Aires, 13 (56), 58-65.

&-A. J. Brodbeck, "Religion and Art as Socializing Agencies: A note on the revision of Marxist and Freudian Theories," Psy Rep, 3 (57), 161-165.

In 32, 5 (Oct 58):

%-Herbert Read. The Tenth Muse: Essays in Criticism. New York: Horizon Press, 58.

&-H e n r i Ellenberger, "The Unconscious before Freud," Bull Menn Clin, 21 (57), 3-15.

*-Franz Borkenau, "Zwei Abhandlungen zur griechischen Mythologie," Psyche, Heidelberg, 11 (57), 1-27.

&-Gustav Bychowski, "Art, Magic, and the Creative Ego," Psa, 4 (57), 4; 5, 1; 125-135.

*-Armand Muller, "Petite incursion dans la mythologie grecque," Acta psyther psysom orthopaed, 5 (57), 74-87.

&-Donald Horton, "The Dialogue of Courtship in Popular Songs," Amer Jl Sociol, 62 (57), 569-578.

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*-Rosalie H. Wax (Univ of Chicago), "Les notions de 'l'ego' et de 'l'id' dans la

v i e i l l e littérature scandinave," Rev psy peuples, 12 (57), 317-332.

&-David Beres, "Communication in Psychoanalysis and in the Creative Process," Jl Amer Psa Assn, 5 (57), 408-423.

*-George Devereux, "Penelope's Character," Psa Qtrly, 26 (57), 378-386. [Homer, Odyssey Bk. XXIII.]

*-Heinz Kohut, "'Death in Venice' by Thomas Mann: A Story about the Disintegration of Artistic Sublimation," ibid, 206-28.

*-Charles Rycroft, "A Detective Story: Psychoanalytic Observations," i b i d, 229-245. [Wilkie Collins.]

&-Hans Göppert, "Das Erlebnis des Schönen im Rahmen der Libidoentwicklung," Psyche, Heidleberg, 11 (57), 270-274.

*-Annemarie Schöne, "D a s 'Grausame' im deutschen und englischen literarischen Kinderhumor," Psy Beitr, 3 (57), 108-125.

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?-Maryse Choisy, "Le fils de l'amazone," Psyché, Paris, 1957, No. 120-121, 337-346.

&-Maurice Denis, "A propos du mythe de Charlot," ibid, 367-370. [Charlie Chaplin and the Wandering Jew.]

%-George Devereux, Renato J. Almansi, & Mark Kanner, "Applied Psychoanalysis," in J. Frosch & N. Ross, edrs., The Annual Survey of Psa, IV (57), 307-389.

&-Donald Clark Hodges, "The Ethics of Freudian G u i l t," Arch Crim Psydynam, 2 (57), 413-449.

*-Walter Cerf, "Psychoanalysis and the Realistic D r a m a," Jl Aesthet, 16 (58), 328-336. [O'Neill, Long Day's Journey; Laurents, Clearing in the Woods.]

%-George Devereux, "The Awarding of a Penis as Compensation for Rape: A Demonstration of the Clinical Relevance of the Psycho-analytic Study of Cultural Data," Int Jl Psa, 38 (57), 398-401. [Greek myth, Kaineus.]

*-Joseph Gabel, "Die Verdinglichung in Camus l'Etranger," Jb Psy Psyther, 5 (58), 123-140. [Camus + Swift, Kierkegaard, Kafka.]

%-León Grinberg, "Si Yo Fuera Usted: Contribución al estudio de la identificación proyectiva," Rev psa, Buenos Aires, 14 (57), 355-367. [Julien Green, If I Were You.]

%-J. Morin and G. Ravaud, "Passion morbide, imagination et anomalies d e s conduites," Ann méd-psy, 1 (57), 5, 837-864. [Zola, The Dream.]

In 33, 3 (June 59):

&-Konrad Wolff. Psychologie und Sittlichkeit. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 58.

&-David Bakan. Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 58.

&-Frederick H. Hacker, "Symbole und Psychoanalyse," Psyche, Heidelberg, 11 (58), 641-671.

&-C. Crockett, "Psychoanalysis in A r t Criticism," Jl Aesthet, 17 (58), 34-44.

%-Walter Hirsch, "The Image of the Scientist in Science Fiction: A Content Analysis," Amer Jl Sociol, 63 (58), 506-512.

%-Ernest Jones, "The Birth and Death of Moses," Int Jl Psa, 39 (58), 1, 1-14.

*-Laura Jean McAdams. H. T a i n e: The Neurotic. Diss Abstr, 18 (58), 665-666.

&-R. Bilz, "Der Verdrängungsschutz: Eine Untersuchung über das Paradigma der Verdrängung bei Nietzsche und bei Freud," Nervenarzt, 29 (58), 145-148.

In 33, 4 (Aug 59):

*-Edmund Bergler, "D. H. Lawrence's 'The Fox' and the Psychoanalytic Theory of Lesbianism," Jl Ner Ment Dis, 126 (58), 488-491.

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*-Katherine Jones, "King Mark Disguised As Himself," 2 (Sum), 115-125. [The widow of Ernest Jones bases her analysis on the Bédier synthesis of the Tristan legends, and on the Swinburne, Wagner, Masefield, and Hardy versions.]

*-Samuel A. Weiss, "The Biblical Story of Ruth: Analytic Implications of the Hebrew Masoretic Text," ibid, 195-209.

&-Laurence Loeb, "Psychopathography and Toulouse-Lautrec," 3 (Fall), 213-224. [Refers to Baudelaire's Femmes Damnées.]

*-Gordon Ross S m i t h, "Shakespeare and Freudian Interpretations," ibid, 226-229. [Disposes succinctly, and to your Editor, finally, of psychoanalytic "Oxfordism."]

%-Ronald R. Koegler, "In Defense of the Pun," ibid, 231-235.

&-Harold Feldman, "The Problem of Personal Names as a Universal Element in Culture," ibid, 238-250.

&-G. W. Bruyn (Leyden) & U. J. de Jong (Utrecht), "The Midas-syndrome: An Inherent Psychological Marriage-Problem," ibid, 251-262.

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From Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review, Vol. 46 (59):

%-Harold Feldman, "The Tragic Comedy of Great Men," 3 (Fall), 3-16.

&-Reuben Fine reviews Erich Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission: An Analysis of His Personality and Influence (New York: Harper's, 59), ibid, 120-125.

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&-Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, "Adler's Psychology and the Jewish Tradition," 14, 2 (Nov 58), 142-152.

%-Herbert McArthur (Eng Dept, Univ of Vt), "The Necessity of Choice," ibid, 153-157.

*-Alice Friedman, "Inferiority Feelings and a Growing Genius," ibid, 171-172. [An early poem — in English — by Goethe.]

&-Norbett L. Mintz, "Concerning Goethe's Approach to the Theory of Color," 15, 1 (May 59), 33-49.

&-O. Hobart Mowrer, "Comments on Trude Weiss-Rosmarin's 'Adler's Psychology and the Jewish Tradition'," ibid, 128-129.

In the Books Received section of 15, 2 (Nov. 59), 250, there appears:

&-Sidney Hook, edr. Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy: A Symposium. New York: NYU Press, 59. Professor Hook is quoted as saying,

> Freud's psychoanalysis is palpably inadequate to account for the varied achievements of creative artists and philosophers and scientists but also the work of poetic mythologists like Freud himself.

From The Psychological Record:

*-Paul Swartz, "Perspectives in Psychology: IX. Literature as Art and as Knowledge," 9, 1 (Jan 59), 7-10. [This is an expansion of the paper delivered by the author at the Symposium on "Influences of Depth Psychology on Literary Criticism," arranged and chaired by your Editor for the Division on Aesthetics of the American Psychological Association, on September 1, 1958. See VIII, 4, 48.]

From Psychological Newsletter:

&-George V. Coelho, "A Guide to Literature of Friendship: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography," 10 (59), 365-394. [From Aristotle to anthropology.]

From The American Psychologist, 14, 7 (July 59) among offerings at the 1959 APA Convention:

*-Mary Jeffrey Collier (Louisiana State), "The Psychological Appeal of the Cinderella Theme" (Studies in Esthetics), 392.

&-Clifford Odets and William Gibson, playwrights, conducted a symposium for the Division on Aesthetics on "Fertility and Sterility in the Artist," 382.

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